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Naval Aviation is in the midst of a major 
transformation as it attempts to come to terms with the 
demands of maintaining operational readiness in the face 
of diminishing budgets and reduced manning. Diminishing 
operating and procurement budgets mean that Naval 
Aviation is for the most part "making do" with existing 
aircraft. Over the past decade, one in four Naval 
Aviation mishaps were partially attributable to 
maintenance error. The present operating environment 
underscores the need to address maintenance error and 
its causes. 
The current study accomplishes three things. First, 
it evaluates 470 Naval Aviation mishaps with distinct 
maintenance error correlates. Second, it categorizes 
those errors using a taxonomy based upon current 
organizational and psychological theories of human 
error. Third, it mathematically models the consequences 
of these errors and uses the models to (a) predict the 
frequency with which maintenance-based mishaps will 
occur in the future and (b) approximate the potential 
cost savings from the reduction of each error type. 
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Naval Aviation is in the midst of a major 
transformation as it attempts to accommodate the demands 
of maintaining operational readiness in the face of 
diminishing budgets and reduced manning. The effects of 
Naval Aviation mishaps are significant in terms of loss 
of life, money, mission readiness, and mission 
capability. Over the past decade, one in four Naval 
Aviation mishaps were partially attributable to 
maintenance error. Throughout the past decade, Naval 
Aviation leadership has focused attention on the role of 
aircrew error and has seen a concomitant decrease· in 
mishaps. However, leadership has not focussed on 
maintenance-related mishaps (MRMs) when, in point of 
fact, the maintenance of existing platforms will become 
increasingly important. Unless dramatic changes occur in 
the current operational environment, Naval Aviation will 
be confronted with a diminishing number of 
aircraft that are rapidly aging. 
fleet 
The baseline methodological tool of this thesis is 
the Human Factors Accident Classification System 
(HFACS). The HFACS is a contemporary data collection and 
organizational instrument designed to aid in the 
xv 
analysis of Naval Aviation mishaps. It integrates 
theories and models derived from the psychological and 
organizational literature to produce a taxonomic tool 
with which an accident investigator can categorize the 
various forms of human error that may have been related 
to the mishap. The Maintenance Extension used in the 
present study is simply a variant of the HFACS. It is 
designed to focus the classification system on human 
error forms associated with maintenance. 
The Maintenance Extension of the HFACS was used to 
evaluate human error directly associated with 
maintenance actions in 470 Naval Aviation MRMs. The 
analysis identified five human error categories out of 
ten that were most frequently associated with MRMs. 
These categories were error, squadron, violation, 
unforeseen, and crew-resource management. At least one 
··of these five error types was present in over 95 percent 
of the 470 mishaps studied. 
Information generated from the classification of 
human error was used to develop mathematical models 
which were then employed to develop a notional cost 
estimate associated with human errors in maintenance-
related Naval Aviation mishaps. These models were, in 
turn, used with archival maintenance error data to gauge 
xvi 
the potential impact of maintenance error reduction 
programs. Taken together, the taxonomic analysis and the 
model development accomplished two things. First, they 
identified the forms that maintenance error takes and 
the conditions under which they occur. Second, they 
identified the optimal point to employ intervention 
strategies to generate the most cost savings. 
A variable Poisson process model was chosen as the 
simplest model that was suitable for predicting future 
mishaps. Probability tables for the number of future 
mishaps were derived from the density function 
associated with the means of the hypothetical Poisson 
process model. The average number of mishaps per year 
predicted by this model over the next five years ranged 
from 22 to 33 per year. Based on these values, the 
expected cost of MRMs for fiscal year 1998 was nearly 60 
million dollars and well over 200 million for FY98 
through FY02. An analysis of potential reductions 
associated with these error types revealed that cutting 
their occurrence by as low as 10 percent can save 
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Naval Aviation is in the midst of a major 
transformation as it attempts to come to terms with the 
demands of maintaining operational readiness in the face 
of diminished budgets and reduced manning. Losing human 
or material assets because of an accident or mishap is 
amplified in today's operating environment. This is 
especially true for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps whose 
strategy of "Forward Presence" require that they will be 
first on the scene in times of crisis. In particular, 
the record will show that Naval Aviation is most likely 
to be called upon to project force during crises. These 
operational requirements and Naval Aviation's response 
to them impact the aircraft, the aircrews, the 
maintainers who prepare the aircraft for flight, and the 
equipment those technicians use to maintain it (Nutwell 
and Sherman, 1997). 
Naval Aviation's leadership has focused much 
attention on the role of aircrew error in mishaps over 
the past several years, and this has led to a dramatic 
1 
reduction in the overall Class A Flight mishap rate 1 
(Department of the Navy, 1997a) These reductions are 
attributable to several focused intervention programs 
and strategies aimed at reducing the causes of aircrew 
error; for example, the establishment of aircrew 
coordination training events and human factors councils. 
Unfortunately I such efforts do not address maintenance 
error and the conditions that cause it. Yet, during the 
past decade, maintenance error contributed to one in 
every four Naval Aviation mishaps. 
Diminishing operating and procurement budgets mean 
that Naval Aviation must "make do" with existing 
aircraft. And, as operational requirements increase, 
these aircraft tend to be flown less to extend their 
life and reduce operating costs (Lockhardt, 1997). 
Additionally, older aircraft generally require more 
·maintenance, more inspections, more major overhauls, and 
more operating limitations. This increased maintenance 
sup.port is required to off set an aging fleet, which in 
turn underscores the need to address maintenance error 
and its causes. The need to preserve aviation assets and 
to address the problems associated with the aging 
aircraft fleet prompted Naval Aviation leadership to 
1 Definitions can be found on page 6. 
2 
thoroughly examine aviation maintenance plans, policies, 
procedures, and practices. 
Today's operational and budgetary climate demands 
management attention be focused on maintenance-related 
mishaps (MRMs). Naval Aviation must identify the types 
of maintenance errors associated with mishaps, and then 
implement intervention programs and strategies aimed at 
reducing the causes of these errors. The present study 
will take a step toward that goal. It will identify 
human error forms associated with past MRMs and then 
develop mathematical models to evaluate the most likely 
impact a program of focused maintenance error reduction 
might have. 
When evaluating the general impact of human error 
on any given outcome variable, it is methodologically 
necessary to first differentiate between classes of 
error forms and then specify those forms associated with 
any particular mishap. Based upon that taxonomy, 
mathematical models can then be developed to predict the 
frequency of MRMs, project the magnitude of their 
associated costs, and forecast the impact various 
intervention strategies may have upon Naval Aviation 
assets. This thesis did the aforementioned and showed 
that reductions in certain maintenance errors by as 
3 
little as 10 percent may save Naval Aviation millions of 
dollars annually. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The current Commander of the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), Vice Admiral Lockhardt, stated that 
the average age of naval aircraft will continue to 
increase into the 21st century. He predicts that mission 
capability and readiness is directly coupled to this 
clear negative trend if left unchecked. To counter this 
negative trend, NAVAIR is investigating the potential 
impact of implementing new maintenance concepts 
including phased depot maintenance, the acceleration of 
depot work and inspection, and depot maintenance 
efficiencies from reliability centered maintenance 
actions. NA VAIR has also solicited the fleet for new 
ideas and has directed greater command focus on aviation 
maintenance issues. These efforts underscore the fact 
that NAVAIR must, and is, identifying and directing 
interventions to accommodate maintenance-related hazards 
and risks. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The present thesis will address Naval Aviation MRMs 
in a systematic fashion. Accordingly, it identifies the 
4 
human-error types that contribute to MRMs and 
investigates the following areas: 
1. The form of human errors, both direct and indirect, 
that lead to maintenance-related aviation mishaps; 
2. The ability of stochastic models to predict future 
MRMs and mishap costs; 
3. The type of intervention strategy or strategies -
personnel training, improved policies and 
procedures, and command climate - that would "best" 
reduce MRMs; and 
4. The impact reducing prevalent forms of maintenance 
errors by 10 , 2 0, and 3 0 percent would have on 
future mishaps and overall costs to Naval Aviation. 
D. OBJECTIVE 
The present study examines Naval Aviation MRMs to 
assess the nature of human error involvement and to 
determine potential cost savings of intervention 
strategies designed to reduce these errors. The primary 
objective is to determine which forms of human error are 
most preval'ent, most costly in terms of loss of life, 
and most expensive in overall cost. A secondary 
objective is to present a methodology for modeling and 




This study used the following definitions 
(Department of the Navy, 1997b) 
Naval Aircraft. Refers U.S. Navy, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft. 
Mishap. A naval mishap is an unplanned event or 
series of events directly involving naval aircraft, 
which result in 10 thousand dollars of greater 
cumulative damage to naval aircraft or personnel 
injury. 
Mishap Class. Mishap severity classes are based on 
personnel injury and property damage. 
a. Class A Severity. A mishap in which the 
total cost of property damage (including 
all aircraft damage) is $1,000,000 or 
greater; or a naval aircraft is destroyed 
or missing; or any fatality or permanent 
total disability occurs with direct 
involvement of naval aircraft. 
b. Class B Severity. A mishap in which the 
total cost of property damage (including 
all aircraft damage) is $200,000 or more, 
but less than $1,000,000 and/or a 
permanent partial disability, and/or the 
hospitalization of five or more personnel. 
c. Class C Severity. A mishap in which the 
total cost of property damage (including 
all aircraft damage) is $10,000 or more 
but less then $200,000 and/or injury 
results in one or more lost workdays. 
Mishap Categories (Types). Naval aircraft mishap 
categories are defined below: 
a. Flight Mishap (FM). Those mishaps in which 
there was $10,000 or greater DOD aircraft 
damage or loss of a DOD aircraft, and 
intent for flight for DOD aircraft existed 
at the time of the mishap. Other property 
6 
damage, injury, or death may or may not 
have occurred. 
b. Flight Related Mishap (FRM). Those mishaps 
in which there was less than $10,000 DOD 
aircraft damage, and intent for flight 
(for DOD aircraft) existed at the time of 
the mishap, and $10,000 or more total 
damage or a defined injury or death 
occurred. 
c. Aircraft Ground Mishap (AGM). Those 
mishaps in which no intent for flight 
existed ·at the time of the mishap and DOD 
aircraft loss, or $10,000 or more aircraft 
damage, and/or property damage, or a 
defined injury occurred. 
F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study examines Flight Mishaps (FM) , Flight-
Related Mishaps (FRM), and Aircraft-Ground Mishaps (AGM) 
which occurred from FY90 to FY97 and were caused, in 
part or wholly, by maintenance errors. The focus of the 
work is on maintenance operators. Personal injury 
accidents are not considered. 
7 
8 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The literature review for this research included 
journals and textbooks covering the subjects of accident 
prevention, reporting, investigation, and causation. The 
purpose of this literature review is to provide an 
overview of the historic and current theories and 
practices concerning mishaps and to provide a rational 
basis to classify maintenance error. 
B. ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
1. Origins and Practice 
Interest in accident prevention did not begin until 
the beginning of the 20th century when employers 
realized that it was less expensive to prevent accidents 
than to pay for their consequences (Petersen, 1978). 
Organizations confronted with the challenge of how best 
to protect themselves and their employees from accidents 
have two options, namely, insurance and accident 
prevention programs (Pate-Cornell, 1996). Organizations 
typically employ both options (Kanis and Weegels, 1990), 
but the U.S. Navy does not purchase insurance and 
accordingly, must absorb the costs of any losses. 
9 
Accident prevention initiatives therefore, are the 
primary means Naval Aviation has 
associated with mishaps. 
to reduce costs 
Accident prevention was initially based on the 
widely held notion that people committing unsafe acts, 
not their working conditions, were to blame for most 
accidents (Heinrich, 1941). This thinking fostered a 
preoccupation with assigning blame to people; a practice 
which hindered the development of systematic accident 
prevention well into the later half of this century 
(Manuele, 1981). Narrowly focusing on people and not on 
the environment in which they operate, tended to obscure 
a subset of associated causal factors. This is 
particularly true with systems that chronically expose 
individuals to hazards (Schmidt, 1987). Although there 
have been substantial advances in accident prevention in 
recent decades, the practice of blaming individuals fbr 
the accident, rather than the conditions associated with 
it, persists. This practice must be overcome and 
accidents must be analyzed in terms of the systems. in 
which they occur. 
10 
2. Systems Engineering 
The most effective accident prevention strategies 
employ systems engineering (Hawkins, 1987). The systems 
engineering approach was developed in the 1950's as part 
of the United States military's large-scale weapons 
programs. Systems engineering transforms operational 
needs into a description of system parameters and 
integrates them to optimize overall system effectiveness 
(Edwards, 1988). In addition, it focuses the level of 
analysis on the smallest identifiable system components 
and how these components interact (Bird, 1974). The 
strategy of focusing on the system through the 
development of well-defined system components exposes 
information that would have remained unknown without a 
system-level evaluation (Miller, 1988) 
Systems engineering pays attention to the strengths 
and limitations of the human operator as an integral 
part of the system. The literature suggests that nearly 
90 percent of accidents are attributable to human error 
(Heinrich, Petersen, and Roos, 1980; Hale and Glendon, 
1987). Therefore, evaluating human factors associated 
with accidents can contribute to the understanding of 
systems and how they fail. 
11 
3. The SHEL Model 
In the early 1970's the "SHEL Model" of system 
design was developed to provide a better way to evaluate 
failures in human-machine systems (Edwards, 1988). The 
"SHEL Model" identifies and defines four system 
dimensions: Software, !!ardware, ~nvironment, and 
Liveware. Edwards (1988) defines SHEL concepts as 
follows: 
1. Software: the rules, regulations, laws, orders, 
standard operating procedures, customs, practices, 
and habits that govern the manner in which the 
system operates and in which the information within 
it is organized. Software is typically a collection 
of documents. 
2. Hardware: the buildings, vehicles, equipment, and 
materials of which the system is comprised. 
3. Environmental conditions: the physical, 
political · and social factors within 
software, hardware, and liveware operate. 
economic, 
which the 
4. Liveware: the human beings involved with the system. 
These system dimensions and the relationships between 
them comprise the basis of Edward's "SHEL Model" which 
is depicted in Figure 1. 
12 
Figure 1: SHEL Model of System Design 
The main assumption of the "SHEL Model" is that the 
·system will fail when a failure occurs in any one of the 
four dimensions or ·in the connections between them. 
Edwards (1988) asserts that people are rarely the sole 
cause of accidents; but rather, accidents are caused by 
the interaction of several factors (Shappell -and 
Wiegmann, 1997). The "SHEL Model" is a substantial 
departure from the commonly held belief that accidents 
are caused by single events (Edwards, 1981). The "SHEL 
Model" provides a method to describe systems, identify 
potential areas for concern within a system, and provide 
a general framework for accident investigation. 
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C. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
Understanding systems and the environment in which 
they operate provides a sound basis for accident 
investigation because when accidents occur they occur 
within their industrial and organizational context 
(Wagenaar, Groeneweg, and Hudson, 1994). The accident 
investigation process initially involves a retrospective 
analysis of past accidents to identify and focus upon 
areas of probable high risk. During this phase of the 
investigatory process, archival data are used to 
identify clusters of causal factors associated with the 
accident. These clusters are then used . to help focus 
future safety efforts whose goal it is to recommend 
effective interventions that decrease the incidence of 
mishaps (McElroy, 1974). 
Unfortunately, the perceptions of individual 
accident investigators can confound the goals of an 
accident investigation (Benner, 1982). Furthermore, 
despite the large number of accidents investigated, no 
generally accepted method of investigation exists 
(Benner, 1975). Accident investigators need to have 
well-defined objectives and a conceptual framework 
within which to work. Unless models of accident 
causation aid investigators in their analysis and serve 
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as potential predictors of future accident scenarios, 
their usefulness will be limited (Hale, 
Hornrnels, 1990) . 
D. ACCIDENT REPORTING 
Stoop, and 
Accident reports have traditionally focused on 
frequencies of occurrence and observations per unit 
time. However, frequencies and rates alone do not 
provide a sound basis to understand accidents (Brown, 
1990a) . A typical accident report consists of a 
narrative describing the accident accompanied by 
supporting documentation. The conventional process of 
reporting accidents varies in scope, depth, quality, 
objectivity, and suffers from 





addition, human factors information concerning accidents 
is often not present because the traditional reporting 
format does not typically capture this class of 
variables (Adams, Barlow, and Hiddlestone, 1981). 
Accident reports can aid in the determination of 
cause and the prevention of accidents only if the 
methods used to collect, classify, and record data are 
accurate and reliable. Accident reports are most useful 
when the information they contain is free from bias, is 
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based on the potential severity or frequency of 
occurrence, and is easily extractable (Adams and 
Hartwell, 1977). 
Chapanis (1962) finds three elements essential for 
a good accident reporting system: properly trained 
investigators, a good accident report form, and 
centralized facilities for handling reports. Two of the 
most important functions of accident reporting systems 
are first, to prevent future accidents and second, to 
lessen the severity of the accidents that do occur 
(Brown, 1990b). Unfortunately, many accident-reporting 
methods do not meet these two design goals; instead, 
they tend to evolve without proper and coherent design 
objectives (Adams and Hartwell, 1977; Mayer and 
Ellingstad, 1992). This nonsystematic process causes 
subsequent data analysis to be very difficult (Primble 
and O'Toole, 1982) because the r~search design typically 
employed in analyzing the data generated by this process 
has been: 
1. to gather data on past accidents within a 
population; 
2. to divide the sample into groups with and without 
accidents; 
3. to obtain measurements of individual 
characteristics on all subjects; 
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4. to statistically compare the measures for the two 
groups; and finally 
5. to identify whether the two groups are 
significantly different, thereby concluding that 
the differential characteristic is strongly 
associated with accidents. 
Many studies have used this general approach, but, the 
conclusions based on it are suspect. (Hale and Hale, 
1972, Hansen, 1988; and Shaw and Sichel, 1971; as cited 
by Hansen 1989, p.81) 
The outcome of an analysis based on this 
conventional method is suspect because the variable 
identified as a causal factor may not actually be 
responsible for the findings. Rather, the variable may 
be correlated to an unknown third variable which itself 
is the causal agent. However, over the past decade the 
tools available for reporting accidents have been 
refined and are now beginning to support more rigorous 
and structured methods of analysis (Leplat, 1989; 
Malaterre, 1990; Reason, 1990; Smith, 1997). The 
capacity of the accident report to provide data capable 
of distinguishing between causal and correlative 
variables determines the utility of possible 
interventions (Hill, Byers, Rothblum, and Booth, 1994). 
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E. ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
1. Theory 
There are several theories of accident causation 
whose objectives are to determine how accidents occur. 
Models of accident causation based on these theories 
attempt to predict and prevent accidents (Goetsch, 
1996). Which theory is most useful is contested, but the 
predominant theme across all of them is that a chain-of-
events culminates in an event called an "accident" 
(Grenier, 1997) . 
"Domino Theory" captures the essence of chain-of-
event theories. "Domino Theory" suggests that accidents 
can be viewed as a five step sequence (Department of the 
Navy, 1997b). 
1. Safety and Management: 
problem. 
This is a supervisory 
2. Basic Causes: This 
environmental factors, 
includes human factors, 
or job related factors. 
3. Immediate Cause: This includes substandard practices 
and conditions. 
4. Accident: This typically is a result of falls or the 
impact of moving objects. 
5. Personal injury and property damage: This includes 
lacerations, fractures, death, and material damage. 
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Effective intervention within the "Domino Theory" 
framework involves removing any of the first three 
"dominos" to prevent accidents, injury, and damage. 
2. The Reason Model 
Reason (1990) developed a model of accident 
causation using the principles of "Domino Theory." This 
model of accident causation was largely the result of a 
comprehensive study of catastrophic failures of complex 
technical and industrial systems. Some of the 
catastrophic failures examined included the U.S. Space 
Shuttle Challenger explosion, the Soviet nuclear reactor 
meltdown in Chernobyl, and the release of deadly gas by 
Union Carbide in Bhopal, India. Reason's model is 
comprised of· three parts: the organizational process, 
task and environmental conditions, and individual unsafe 
acts. This model has been widely used for analyzing the 
role of management policies and procedures and the 
actions of individuals (Sargeant and Cavenagh, 1994). 
This model considers the errors people make the result 





















Limited Window of 
Accident Opportunity 
Figure 2: Reason's Accident Causation Model 
Reason's model of accident causation examines 
accidents within the context of the organization in 
which they occur. Organizational actions that may 
contribute to mishaps are comprised of managerial 
decisions or actions that interact with environmental 
factors and individual unsafe acts to cause an accident 
(Reason, 1991). Unsafe acts that contribute to accidents 
are either errors or violations. Errors and violations 






Baxter, and Campbell, 
1990). Reason (1990) describes this differentiation as 
follows: "Violations require explanation in terms of 
social and motivational factors, whereas errors in the 
form of slips, lapses, and mistakes may be accounted for 
by reference to the information-processing 
characteristics of the individual (p.1315) ." In general, 
this model illustrates how a combination of managerial 
decision-making, failures in technical expertise, and 
distorted communication increases the likelihood of a 
crisis in an organization (Smith, 1995) 
Reason ( 1995) notes that, despite the differences 
in many disasters "-the root causes of these accidents 
have been traced to latent failures and organizational 
errors arising in the upper echelons of the system in 
question (p.1708) ." The common elements of any accident 
which occurs in an organization include latent failures, 
local factors, active failures, and inadequate or absent 
defenses. Sargeant and Cavenagh (1994) define these 
elements as: 
1. Latent failures: arising mainly from management 
decisions or actions whose repercussions may only 
become apparent when they combine with local 
triggering factors to breach the system's defenses. 
These latent failures are normally present well 
before the onset of a recognizable accident 
sequence, and may have remained unnoticed within the 
system for a considerable time. 
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2. Local factors: these are task, situational and 
environmental factors which directly influence 
performance in the workplace. Deficiencies in these 
factors can promote the occurrence of unsafe acts. 
3. Active failures: are those errors or violations 
having an immediate adverse effect. These unsafe 
acts are typically associated with operational 
personnel. 
4. Inadequate or absent defenses: which failed to 
identify and protect the system against technical 
and human failures arising from the three previous 
elements. 
Accidents examined within an organizational context 
yields a more comprehensive understanding of the 
underlying accident process. 
Within this organizational context, mistakes can be 
partitioned into two categories: mistakes caused by the 
lack of expertise and mistakes caused by a failure to 
actually apply expertise. Moreover, the organizational 
framework holds that the basis for these mistakes often 
remain inactive until they are activated by a "trigger 
event" (Smith, 1997) Psychosocial or managerially-
related organizational features, when cojoined with 
seemingly unrelated and improbable events, can manifest 
their union in, yet again, an even more improbable event 
called an "accident." Reason ( 1990) contends that the 
focus of any intervention strategy must consider this 
conjunction between context and acts, which taken 
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together, he calls latent conditions. Latent conditions 
are organized along seven general failure modes, which 
are shown in Table 1. 




























conditions are a primary key in 
comprehending the underlying causes of accidents because 
latent conditions are the result of decisions made by 
individuals who are not in direct control of the system 
(Zotov, 1996). In general, these individuals are not 
front-line operators, but are maintenance personnel, 
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construction workers, and managers associated with the 
system. Active failures on the other hand are those 
which are typically produced by front-line operators of 
the system (Grenier, 1997). Active failures differ from 
latent failures in that the person operating the system 
is responsible for causing them. Latent conditions and 
active failures both result from unsafe acts. 
Reason's (1990) "Model of Unsafe Acts" 
differentiates unsafe acts into two primary categories, 

































Misapplication of good rule 
Application of bad rule 
Knowledge-based mistakes 
Many variable forms 
--...I I Violation ___ ---.------------, 
· Routine violations 
Exceptional violations 
Acts of sabotage 
Figure 3: Psychological Varieties of Unsafe Acts 
This model initially classifies the act according to 
whether it was intended or unintended and then 
distinguishes errors from violations. Unintended acts 
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include slips that are the performance of an action that 
was not what was intended (Norman, 1981), ·and lapses 
that are due to memory failures (Reason, 1990). Intended 
actions included mistakes and violations. Mistakes occur 
when previously learned procedures or rules are 
misapplied unintentionally and violations are the 
willful disregard of established policy or procedures. 
Reason's model provides a framework through which 
the cause of accidents can be studied. In fact, this 
model has been widely used as a basis to understand the 
causes of accidents, but it does not provide a 
comprehensive basis for that analysis ( Shappe 11 and 
Wiegmann, 1997; Zotov, 1996). Wiegmann and Shappell 
(1997) argue that the structure of Reason's "Model of 
Unsafe Acts" needs to be expanded and applied to unsafe 
conditions of the operator and unsafe supervision. Their 
-resulting taxonomy of unsafe ope-rations, which evolved 
into the Human Factors Accident Classification System 
(HFACS), identifies both active and latent human errors 
within three general categories: unsafe acts, unsafe 
conditions of the operator, and unsafe supervision. 
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3. The Human Factors Accident Classification System 
a. overview 
The Human Factors 
System (HFACS) taxonomy was 
Shappell (1997) to help 
Accident Classification 
developed by Wiegmann and 
analyze Naval Aviation 
accidents. HFACS incorporates features of Bird's (1974) 
"Domino Theory," Edward's (1972) "SHEL Model," and 
Reason's (1990) "Unsafe Acts Model." In particular, 
using Edward's (1972) "SHEL Model," failures are 
partitioned into one of three levels of human-component 
failure and its associated organizational environment. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship of the tpree levels of 
human-component failure, which include: 
• Level 1: unsafe supervision. 
• Level 2: unsafe operator conditions. 
• Level 3: unsafe acts of the operator. 
These human-component failure categories 
enable an analyst to identify failures at each of the 
three levels historically related to accidents. This 
classification can then be used to target the most 
appropriate intervention. 
26 
Figure 4: Levels of Human-Component Failure 
b. Organizational Influences 
Human-component failures are always affected 
by organizational influences. HF ACS classifies 
organizational influences into three broad areas: 
resource management, organizational climate, and 
operational processes. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
HF ACS classifications involving organizational 
influence. 
Table 2: Classification of Organizational Influence 
Resource Organizational Operational 
Management Climate Processes 
Human Structure Operations 
Monetary Policies Procedures 
Equipment Culture Oversight &Facility 
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Organizational influence refers to latent 
failures induced by upper-level management that directly 
affect all three levels of human-component failure. 
Latent failures are partitioned into three classes: 
resource management, organizational climate, and 
operational processes. Resource management includes 
human, monetary, and· equipme;mt resources; for example, 
failures induced by excessive cost cutting or lack of 
funding. Organizational climate refers to the prevailing 
culture within an organization. Operational processes 
include the formal methods by which things are 
accomplished in an organization (Shappell and Wiegmann, 
1997). 
c. Unsafe Supervision 
Failures associated with unsafe supervision 
can be partitioned into two subsets. Those that are 
.unforeseen and those that. are. known (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 1997). "Known" unsafe supervision includes 
inaSiequate 
operations, 
supervision, planned inappropriate 
failure to correct known problems, and 
supervisory violations. Supervisory violations include 
circumstances in which front-line or middle-level 
management do not agree with stated policies or openly 
disparage supervisors. Known unsafe supervisory actions 
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often include situations in which the supervisor's 
intent may not be purposefully malicious, but simply 
imperious; that is, the supervisor may simply believe 
that "I know best." 
"Unforeseen" unsafe supervision includes the 
failure to recognize unsafe operations, a lack of 
documentation, and inadequate design. Supervisors may 
have to manage several individuals who are completing 
tasks simultaneously. The workload imposed by this 







personal issues that adversely impact their overall 
effectiveness. Unanticipated equipment design problems 
or a lack of technical specifications, instructions, and 
regulations can also contribute to failures. Challenges 
such as these will always ·exist and will often 
contribute to the sequence of events leading to 
accidents. Table 3 provides a summary of the unsafe 
supervision classification. 
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Table 3: Classification of Unsafe Supervision 
Known Unsafe Supervision 
Inadequate Supervision 
Failure to administer 
proper training 




. Improper work tempo 
Failed to Correct Known 
Problem 
Failure to correct 
inappropriate behavior 
Failure to correct 
Safety hazard 
Supervisory Violations 
Not adhering to rules 
and regulations 
Willful disregard for 
authority by supervisors 
Shappell and Wiegmann (1997) 
Unforeseen Unsafe Supervision 
Failure to Recognize Unsafe 
Operations 




Unrecognized adverse medical 
Conditions 
Life changes (e.g. divorce, 
Family, death, legal, 
Financial, or peEsonal 
Problems) 
Lack of Documentation 




Equipment design that 
contributes to accident 
d. Unsafe Conditions of the Operator 
The unsafe condition and unsafe acts 
categories are closely related. Substandard conditions 
of the opera tor include adverse physiological states, 
adverse mental states, and physical or mental 
limitations. Operator errors manifest themselves as a 
function of increasing workload and can not be avoided, 
but adverse physiological states can greatly increase 
the likelihood of an accident and indeed, can be avoided 
(Groeger, 1990). The second category, adverse mental 
states, involves psychological 
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or mental problems 
affecting the operator. These states, such as 
overconfidence and complacency, deficient situational 
awareness, and fatigue-related problems induced by 
circadian dysrhythmia and general drowsiness must be 
considered by an investigator to provide a more complete 
understanding of failures (Lourens, 1990). The third 
category of unsafe conditions of the operator involves 
diminished physical or mental capabilities of the 
operator. This category also includes special aspects of 
the environment that can adversely impact performance; 
for example, the debilitating effects of a sensorially 
impoverished or satiated environment. 
Substandard practices are partitioned into 
three categories: mistakes and misjudgments, crew 
resource mismanagement, and readiness violations. 
Mistakes and misjudgments often involve behaviors that 
··do not violate existing rules and regulations, yet still 
impair job performance. These behaviors include poor 
dietary practices and overexertion while off duty. Crew 
resource mismanagement includes not working as a team, 
poor crew coordination, improper task briefing, and 
inadequate task coordination. Crew resource management 
focuses on individuals directly engaged in a group task. 
It does not include high-level management personnel. The 
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category of substandard practices of the operator, is 
readiness violation. A readiness violation is assumed 
when regulations regarding crew rest, alcohol 
consumption, or medications are not adhered to. Table 4 
provides a general summary of the dimensions of unsafe 
condition of the operator. 
Table 4: Classification of Unsafe Conditions of the 
Operator 
Substandard Conditions 








Adverse Mental States 






Physical and/or Mental 
Limitation 
Lack of sensory input 




Shappell and Wiegmann (1997) 
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Substandard Practices 
Mistakes and/or Misjudgments 
Poor dietary practices 
Overexertion while off duty 
Crew Resource Mismanagement 
Not working as a team 
Poor aircrew coordination 
Improper briefing before a 
Mission 
Readiness Violation 
Not adhering to regulations 
regarding crew rest, 
alcohol consumption, or 
medications 
e. Unsafe Acts of the Operator 
The classification of unsafe acts of the 
operator is partitioned into unintended and intended 
acts. Intended unsafe acts are defined as acts in which 
an operator deviates from a plan and is unaware of the 
deviation. A deviation from planned action is due either 
to a failure in execution or a failure of memory. Both 
failures occur at the skill-based level of processing. 
Failures in execution are ref erred to as slips and these 
include errors of intrusion, omission, reversal, 
misordering, and mistiming. Slips are due to attentional 
lapses. Memory failures typically involve the omission 
of planned items including losing ones' place and 
forgetting intentions. Operators are usually unaware of 
slips and lapses. 
In tended unsafe acts are either mis takes or 
violations. Mistakes include the misapplication of ·a 
good rule or the application of a bad rule. Mistakes may 
be knowledge-based errors that involve an inaccurate or 
incomplete mental model of the problem space. In 
contrast, knowledge-based errors are the result of an 
operator having insufficient familiarity with the system 
or task. Individuals who are not experts in their field 
33 
or experts not fully familiar with a new system are 
prone to errors of this type. 
The HFACS taxonomy of unsafe acts defines 
violations as intended actions that may be either 
routine or exceptional. Routine violations are habitual 
departures from rules and regulations that are generally 
condoned by management. These violations are commonly 
viewed by operators and management as being acceptable 
departures from rules or regulations. Table 5 provides a 
summary of this classification (Shappell and Wiegmann, 
1997) . 





















Misapplication of a good rule 
Application of a bad rule 
Knowledge-based 
Inaccurate or incomplete mental 
model of the problem space 
Violations 
Routine 
Habitual departures from rules and 
regulations condoned by management 
Isolated departures from rules and 
regulations not condoned by 
management 
Exceptional 
Shappell and Wiegmann (1997) 
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F. THE HFACS MAINTENANCE EXTENSION 
The HFACS Maintenance Extension taxonomy was used 
in the present work to classify causal factors that 
contribute to maintenance related mishaps. This addition 
to the HFACS consists of four broad human error 
categories: Supervisory Conditions, Working Conditions, 




Figure 5: HFACS Maintenance Extension 
Supervisory Conditions, Working Conditions, and 
Maintainer Conditions are latent conditions that can 
impact a maintainer's performance and can contribute to 
an active failure. A maintainer's active failure may 
lead directly to a mishap or injury; for example, a 
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maintainer who runs a forklift into the side of an 
aircraft. The active failure could also become a latent 
condition with which the aircrew would have to 
accommodate in flight. Maintenance Conditions can 
directly lead to mishap or injury through no fault of 
the aircrew; for example, an improperly rigged landing 
gear that collapses on touchdown. 
Maintenance Conditions can also cause an emergency 
that the aircrew must ultimately accommodate in flight. 
The end result would at least be minor damage or injury 
or in the worst case, could lead to loss of an aircraft 
and loss of life; for example, a fire caused by an over-
torqued hydraulics line that ruptures in flight. It is 
important to note that Supervisory Conditions related to 
aircraft design for maintainability, prescribed 
maintenance procedures, and standard maintenance 
operations could be inadequate and lead directly to ·a 
Maintenance Condition. The three orders of maintenance 
error - first order, second order, and third order -
reflect a decomposition of the error type from a molar 
to a micro perspective. These three orders are 
summarized in Table 6. 
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The classification of latent Supervisory Conditions 
that can contribute to an active failure includes both 
unforeseen and squadron error types. Examples of 
situations potentially leading to unforeseen supervisory 
conditions include: 
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• An engine that falls off an engine-stand during 
change-out evolution due to an unforeseen hazard of 
a high sea state (Unrecognized Unsafe Operation) . 
• A maintenance plan that omits a necessary step in a 
maintenance procedure, such as leaving out an o-ring 
that causes a fuel leak (Inadequate Documentation). 
• The poor layout of system components that 
permit direct observation of maintenance 
performed (Inadequate Design). 
do not 
being 
Examples of situations potentially leading to 
squadron Supervisory Conditions include: 
an 
• A supervisor· who does not ensure that maintenance 
personnel are wearing required personal protective 
gear (Inadequate Supervision). 
• A supervisor who directs a maintainer to perform an 
operation without considering associated risks, such 
as driving a truck through an aircraft hanger 
(Planned Inappropriate Operations) . 
• A supervisor who neglects to correct maintainers who 
routinely bend the rules when they perform a routine 
check (Failed to Correct Problem) . 
• A supervisor who willfully orders a 
wash an aircraft without proper 
(Supervisory Violation) . 
maintainer to 
safety gear 
Latent Maintainer Conditions that can contribute to 
active failure include medical, crew resource 
management, and personal readiness. Examples of 
maintainer medical conditions include: 
• A maintainer who has a marital problem and can not 
focus on a maintenance action being taken (Mental 
State) . 
• A maintainer who worked 20 hours straight and 
suffers from mental and physical fatigue (Physical 
State) . 
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• A maintainer who is short and can not visually 
inspect aircraft before it is prepared for a 
catapult launch {Physical Limitation). 
Examples of maintenance crew resource management 
conditions include: 
• A ma,intainer who leads an aircraft being taxied into 
another parked aircraft because improper hand 
signals were used {Corrununication) . 
• A maintainer who performs a maintenance action not 
in accordance with standard maintenance procedures 
because the maintainer was overly submissive to a 
superior {Assertiveness) . 









Examples of maintenance personal readiness conditions 
include: 
• A maintainer working on an aircraft al though the 
maintainer did not review proper training material 
{Training) . 
• A maintainer engages in a procedure that they are 
not qualified to perform {Qualification) . 
• A maintainer intoxicated on the job {Violation). 
Latent Working Conditions such as poor 
environmental factors, inadequate equipment, and 
uncomfortable workspaces all impact maintainer acts. For 
example, a maintainer who must work in a confined 
workspace or on the deck of an aircraft carrier during 
bad weather and heavy seas will likely perform poorly. 
Similarly, a maintainer who unknowingly uses outdated 
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maintenance publications or damaged ground support 
equipment can adversely impact the quality of the 
maintenance. Working Conditions include the physical 
environment in which the maintainer works and the tools 
they use in the course of their work. 
Active failures in the form of Maintainer Acts 
include both errors ·and violations. Active failure can 
directly cause damage and injury, or lead to a latent 
maintenance condition. Active failures include: 
• A maintainer who misses a hand signal and backs a 
forklift into an aircraft (Attention) . 
• A mechanic who may be very familiar with a certain 
sequence of multiple steps that must be taken, but 
may inadvertently reverse the ordering of two of the 
steps within the sequence and unwittingly contribute 
to an accident .(Memory). 
• A maintainer who inflates an aircraft tire to a 
pressure required for a differept type of aircraft 
tire (Rule) . 
• A mechanic who roughly handles a delicate engine 
valve and breaks a piece off (Skill) . 
The HFACS Maintenance Extension defines violations 
as intended actions that may be either routine or 
exceptional. Routine violations are practices that are 
habitual departures from rules and regulations that are 
generally condoned by management. These violations are 
commonly viewed by operators and management as being 
acceptable departures from rules or regulations. An 
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example of a routine violation might include a situation 
where a forklift operator knowingly exceeds a speed 
limit in an aircraft hanger by three to five. miles per 
hour, and management is aware of this violation yet does 
not intervene. In comparison, an exceptional violation 
would include a situation where the forklift operator 
exceeds the aircraft-hanger speed limit by twenty miles 
per hour. 
G. SUMMARY 
A human error taxonomy is a tool used to evaluate 
accidents. The HFACS Maintenance Extension is a taxonomy 
designed specifically for the analysis of aviation 
maintenance-related mishaps. This taxonomy was developed 
within the framework of the HFACS taxonomy that proved 
useful in the analysis of pilot error associated with 
aviation mishaps. Furthermore, the HFACS Maintenance 
Extension is based upon established theories of human 
error and system design. Accordingly, the HF ACS 
Maintenance Extension was chosen for use in the present 




A. RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research involved the adaptation and analysis 
of an existing accident mishap database maintained by 
the U.S. Naval Safety Center. This mishap database 
includes all Naval Aviation Class A, B, and C Flight, 
Flight-Related, and Aircraft Ground mishaps. The 
database consists· of data taken from mishap 
investigation reports (MIRs) submitted by Aircraft 
Mishap Boards (AMBs) Each MIR follows a prescribed 
format and includes a brief summary of the mishap event, 
characteristics of the mishap, and a summary of causal 
factors (Department of the Navy, 1997b). 
The analysis of this data consists of four phases. 
The first phase examines the operational environment in 
which the mishaps used in this study occurred, then it 
describes the mishaps themselves. The second phase 
develops and evaluates mathematical models that 
represent the underlying mishap arrival process. The 
third phase identifies and summarizes human errors 
associated with each mishap. The final phase presents 
cost savings estimates based on potential reductions of 
human error in aviation maintenance. The cost saving 
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estimates are based on the specific human errors 
associated with various maintenance actions and the 
mathematical models developed to represent them. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
The Naval Safety Center aviation mishap database 
was queried to identify all Naval Aviation MRMs. A total 
of 470 MRMs from FY90 through FY97 were obtained. Data 
included the mishap date, Type (e.g., FM, FRM, and AGM), 
Class (e.g., Class A, B, and C), associated casual 
factors, and the cost. Additionally, data were obtained 
from the Naval Safety Center and the Chief of Naval Air 
Warfare (N88) on the number of flight-hours flown per 
month, the number of fleet aircraft in operation per 
month, and the average age of those aircraft. Monthly 
totals of the mishaps were used and treated as point-
event data to infer the data's pattern and properties. 
Causal factors associated with the mishaps were coded 
according the HFACS Maintenance Extension to account for 
the range of human error types. 
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C. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Data Tabulation 
The occurrences of MRMs and associated error types, 
and additional relevant data were entered into a 
spreadsheet for subsequent analysis. Monthly totals of 
these data were calculated and served as the basis for 
this analysis. 
2. Analysis 
The frequency of mishaps by Class and Type were 
determined. Various mathematical models were fitted to 
the data to find the one that best fit it. Human errors 
associated with the mishaps were identified and an 
estimate of dollar savings resulting from the reduction 
of each error type was produced. Procedural and policy 





The rate of Naval Aviation MRMs of all Classes and 
Types per 100,000 flight-hours has generally decreased 
during FY90 through FY97. In particular, Figure 6 shows 
the .number of Naval Aviation MRMs has decreased from an 
average of 3 .1 mishaps for FY90-FY94 to an average of 
1.7 for FY95-FY97. In addition, the MRM rate as a 
percentage of the overall Naval Aviation mishap rate has 
dropped 23 percent during this time-period. The MRM rate 
dropped from an average of 30 percent of total mishaps 
















FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 
Fiscal Year 
-0-0verall Mishaps -<>-Maintenance Mishaps 
Figure 6: Naval Aviation Mishap and MRM Rates 
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From October 1989 through September 1997, Naval 
Aviation operated in an environment which had three 
significant trends: a reduction in the overall number of 
flight-hours flown, a reduction in the number of planes 
available, and an increase in the overall average age of 
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Historically, the number of flight-hours flown is 
considered a major factor in the analysis of aviation 
mishaps because increased flight operations increase 
maintenance requirements. Figure 8 shows that the number 
of MRMs per month increase as the number of flight-hours 
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Figure 8: Flight-Hours Flown Versus Number of MRMs 
Patterns in MRMs can be more clearly seen by 
examining them by Class and Type. Figure 9 reveals that 
MRMs are unevenly distributed across Class and Type and 
that Class C mishaps and Aircraft-Ground mishaps (AGMs) 
comprise the largest percentage of mishap Class and 
Type. Table 7 shows that nearly 50 percent of all the 









Figure 9: FY90-FY97 MRMs by Class and Type 
Table 7: FY90~FY97 Maintenance-Related Mishaps 
Flight Flight- Aircraft Total Related -Ground 
Class-A 50 0 13 63 
Class-B 17 6 34 57 
Class-C 90 29 231 350 
Total 157 35 278 470 
Fifty-one people died in these mishaps: 40 were 
attributed to FMs and 11 to AGMs. In terms of direct 
financial costs, MRMs cost Naval Aviation over $800 
million during the period under study; that is, from 
FY90 through FY97. Although Class A Flight mishaps make-
up only 13 percent of all mishaps, Table 8 shows that 
they are the largest contributor to overall cost. Table 
9 contains the average costs of MRMs by Class and Type 
for FY90 through 1997. Costs were normalized to FY98 
dollars using aircraft procurement and weapons 
procurement inflation indices. 
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Table 8: FY90-FY97 Total MRM Costs (FY98$M) 
FM FRM AGM Total 
Class-A 796 0 3 799 
Class-B 8 2 11 22 
Class-C 6 2 9 16 
Total 810 4 23 837 
Table 9: FY90-FY97 Average MRM Costs (FY98$K) 
FM FRM AGM Total 
Class-A .16579 0 260 13537 
Class-B 514 393 362 412 
Class-C 164 56 43 59 
Total 8261 116 91 2168 
B. DATA EXPLORATION 
The frequency with which accidents occur can 
provide valuable information to reveal the accident's 
underlying arrival process. Events, such as accidents, 
and their associated times of occurrence are point-event 
data. One analytic method for point-event data is to 
group the data into finite time intervals then evaluate 
their distribution. Figures 10 and 11 show the 
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Figure 11: Distribution of Monthly Mishaps by Type 
Data were grouped by month and fiscal year in this 
study. Table 10 shows the overall number of 
undifferentiated MRMs by month of occurrence. Tables of 
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the monthly numbers of MRMs partitioned by Class and 
Type are at Appendix A. 
Table 10: Total MRMs by FY 
Time 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total Period 
October 7 2 6 8 3 6 5 6 43 
November 6 8 5 1 5 2 2 0 29 
December 3 6 2 5 3 5 1 3 28 
January 7 13 7 5 6 4 8 3 5~ 
February 8 5 2 6 5 1 6 3 36 
March 8 4 10 5 7 7 4 2 47 
April 4 4 5 2 3 2 1 3 24 
May 6 5 8 6 4 4 4 5 42 
June 4 5 7 9 8 2 2 2 39 
July 5 10 6 9 8 2 3 3 46 
August 5 12 1 5 4 2 2 2 33 
September 5 9 6 7 3 2 4 1 37 
Total 68 83 65 68 59 39 42 33 457 
General indications suggest there is an overall 
decreasing trend in MRMs. However, Figures 12 and 13 
show that this overall-decreasing trend is primarily due 
to a drop in Class C mishaps, FMs, and AGMs. Class A, 
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Figure 12: Mishap Rate by Class 
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 
Fiscal Year 
!~Flight -0-Flight-Related -tr-Air-Ground I 
Figure 13: Mishap Rate by Type 
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C. STOCHASTIC MODELING 
Model fitting was used to reveal MRM' s underlying 
arrival process. Gaver (1996) argues that if a model is 
considered successful it will describe similar patterns 
in future data. Furthermore, he specifies models for the 
occurrence of point event arrivals as relatively simple 
mathematical formulas, which are specified by one or two 
parameters inferred from the data. 
Initial attempts to study the underlying mishap 
process focused on the identification of suitable, 
simple mathematical models that summarize the mishap 
data. The models considered included the Poisson process 
with homogenous and non-homogenous piece-wise constant 
rates, a moving average estimator, and a variable 
Poisson process. The specific question posed was: "Does 
strong evidence exist that the distributions of the 
number of arrivals per unit of time differ from one 
another?" 
Gaver (1996) reasons that models are not 
supposed to be perfect representations of the data sets 
to which they are fitted, but to represent the situation 
of concern well enough to be useful (p. 3) II The models 
considered were tested using a modified denominator-free 
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z 2 statistical test, which is superior to the classical 
z2 statistical test when the data values are small and 
include zeros (Freeman and Tukey, 1950). It was 
determined on an a priori basis that models with 
probabilities lower than 0.05 would not be used. 
The variable Poisson process model was found to be 
most adequate statistically in describing the MRMs. The 
variable Poisson process model is a method to generate 
an estimator based on a function fitted to historical 
data (Cox and Lewis,· 1968). A curve is fitted to the 
historical data and is used to predict the mean of the 
hypothetical Poisson process that produces the failures. 
The variable Poisson process model was the simplest 
model found to be suitable based on initial evaluation 
and subsequent cross-validation. Therefore, this model 




B details alternative 
variable Poisson process 
models that were 
model generates 
monthly hypothetical MRM means for the mishap data. The 
value at some month t is assumed to come from a Poisson 
process with mean k, and further it is assumed that k 
follows the exponential decay equation k=a*exp(-b*t). The 
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values a and b are estimated by maximum likelihood. The 
likelihood function is given by 
L(a,b) = exp(-I~=la *exp(-bt))- n;=l[a *exp(-bt)]y; . 
where 'yt is the number of mishaps at time t. The 
log likelihood is 
f = -I~=1 a* exp(-bt) + I~=1 Yr* log[ a* exp(-bt)] . 
This yields the derivatives 
of "n ( b ) "n y; * exp(-bt) 
- = -~ exp - t + ~ OQ t=I t=I Q * exp(-bt) 
I n In Yr In [Yr J = - exp(-bt) + - = - - exp(-bt) t=I t=I a t=I a 
and 
Of_ "n ( )* ( b) "n Yr*a(-t)*exp(-bt) 
- - -~ a -t exp - t + ~ Ob t=I t=I a(-f) * exp(-bt) 
An S-plus computer program was developed to 
generate the values of a and b that makes the sum 
equal to zero. This computer program can be found 
in Appendix C. 
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Once the equation that meets the criterion of least 
squares is obtained; the predicted values at each month 
t are calculated and compared to the data. Figure 14 
presents the equation fitted to the total MRM data. 
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Figure 14: Variable Poisson Process for Total MRMs 
The distribution of the number of MRMs for each 
month is assumed Poisson with mean Am. The estimate of 
Am is it =a *exp(-b*t) The modified denominator-free z2 
test was used to determine the suitability of the 
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estimates. This goodness of fit test compared 
obtaining a probability, 
P{x;5 ;;:::.k}. Table 11 shows the values of a and b that were 
calculated, the probabilities obtained, and the 
suitability of the models. 
Table 11: Variable Poisson Process Model Validation 
Mishap a b Pkis;;::: .k} Suitability Classification 
Flight 2.3 0.93 0.962 Not Unusual 
Flight-Related 0.7 0.91 0.999 Not Unusual 
Aircraft-Ground 4.3 0.85 0.725 Not Unusual 
Class A 1.0 1. 43 0.989 Not Unusual 
Class B 0.7 1. 08 0.940 Not Unusual 
Class C 6.9 0.46 0.079 Not Unusual 
Total 7.2 1. 38 0.327 Not Unusual 
The variable Poisson process model goodness of fit 
test results are above the 0.05 threshold initially 
established for the suitability of the models. 
Therefore, the variable Poisson process model adequately 
statistically describes FMs, FRMs, AGMs, Class A, Class 
B, and Class C, and total mishaps. An assessment of the 
model for predicting MRM data was tested using 
additional MRM data. Table 12 contains this new mishap 
data. 
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Table 12: October 1997 - March 1998 Monthly MRMs 
Mishap OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR Classification 
Flight 2 2 1 0 1 1 
Flight-Related 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Air-Ground 0 1 2 0 1 0 
Class-A 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Class-B 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Class-C 1 2 3 0 1 1 
Total 3 3 3 0 2 1 
The variable Poisson process models that were fit 
to the original data were tested to determine if they 
adequately predicted the new data not used in the 
initial model. The modified denominator-free z 2 test 
was used to determine the suitability of the estimates 
in this cross-validation. Table 13 shows model 
probabilities and the suitability of the models in 
predicting the new data. Since no estimation was 
involved, results were referenced to a x: random. 
Cross-validation demonstrated that this model was 
suitable for predicting MRM probability distribution. 
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Table 13: Variable Poisson Process Model Cross-Validation 
Mishap P{xJ~i} Suitability Classification 
Flight .57 Not Unusual 
Flight-Related .93 Not Unusual 
Aircraft-Ground .30 Not Unusual 
Class A .80 Not Unusual 
Class B .82 Not Unusual 
Class c .23 Not Unusual 
Total .24 Not Unusual 
D. PROBABILITIES AND EXPECTED FUTURE COSTS 
Probability tables based on equations calculated by 
the variable Poisson process model were developed. The 
values obtained from the equations are means of 
hypothetical Poisson processes that produce the mishaps. 
These means were used to predict the likelihood of 
future mishaps. Probability tables for FY98 and the 
five-year period including FY98 through FY02 provide 
insight into a possible environment facing Naval 
Aviation in the near future. Table 14 presents a summary 
of the FY98 probability table found in Appendix E. 
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The hypothetical expected number of MRMs per year 
were calculated using the variable Poisson process 
model. Values are obtained by summing the hypothetical 
monthly means that were generated by the variable 
Poisson process model. Table 15 presents the expected 
number of mishaps for FY98 through FY02. 
Table 15: Expected MRMs for FY98 
-
FY02 
Mishap 98 99 00 01 02 Classification 
Flight 11. 6 10.4 9.4 8.5 7.7 
Flight-Related 1. 8 1. 5 1.3 1.1 0.9 
Aircraft-Ground 20 .2 18.1 16.2 14.6 13.0 
Class-A 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 
Class-B 5.3 5.0 4.8 4.5 4.3 
Class-C 20.0 17.0 14.4 12.2 10.3 
Total 33.5 30.0 26.8 24.0 21.5 
Expected costs of MRMs for FY98 and for the five-
year period including FY98 through F02 were calculated. 
Costs are assumed independent and identically 
distributed. Mishaps, N, are assumed Poisson and 
independent of cost. Cost is given by Cost= .L:
1
c and 
expected cost was calculated as follows: 
E[Cost] = E[E[Cost IN]] 
= E[N* E[C]] 
= E[N]* E[C] 
The variance of this expected cost is given by 
62 
Var[Cost] = Var[E[Cost IN]]+ E[Var[Cost IN]] 
= Var[N* E[C]]+E[N*Var[C]] 
= E[C]2 *Var[N] + E[N] *Var[C] 
and the standard deviation is 
SD= .Jvar[Cost] 
Cost values were calculated using the expanded 
probability tables in Appendix F and the average costs 
of the MRMs for FY90 through FY97. The expected cost of 
Naval Aviation MRMs for FY98 and the five-year period 
from FY98 through FY02 are in Table 16. The total dollar 
_value shown is an average of the cost totals for mishap 
Type, mishap Class, and mishap total. Cost calculated 
directly using the total mishap variable Poisson model 
was not used alone because cost is highly dependent on 
the Class and Type of the mishap. 
Table 16: Expected Costs of Naval Aviation MRMs in FY98$M 
Mishap FY98 FY98 FY98-FY02 FY98-FY02 Expected Standard Expected Standard Classification Cost Deviation Cost Deviation 
Flight 95.54 13.72 394.04 87.86 
Flight-Related .21 0.26 0.77 21. 34 
Air-Ground 1.84 0.81 7.49 74.91 
Class-A 55.26 35.59 216.99 55.97 
Class-B .19 1.15 9.84 40.41 
Class-C 1.19 0.35 4.37 71.00 
Total 72.62 12.55 294.41 96.29 
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E. HUMAN ERROR IDENTIFICATION 
The Naval Aviation MRMs are categorized according 
to the Human Factors Accident Classification System 
Maintenance Extension. The number of mishaps in which a 
second order human error causal factor is present was 
identified. These human error causal factors are 
categorized by the corresponding HFACS Maintenance 
Extension second order error types in Table 17. 
Table 17: Frequency of Error Type by Accident Type and 
Class 
.w 
i:: i:: .w (!) (!) .w (!) Ul i:: i:: (!) i:: s i:: u rl Ul (!) (!) 0 
Ul 0 i:: (!) tU rl ctl (!) u s ·rl (!) H 0 s Qi tU i:: i:: H <V .w 
H 't) H Qi Ul u O·r.-i I ;::1 Ol H tU 
0 tU ·rl ·rl ...\.::! ·rl Ul '"d ~ 0 ctl 0 rl 
4-1 ;::1 ::> ;::1 H 't) H ctl (!) Ul i:: H 0 
i:: 01 i:: 01 0 (!) (!) (!) l>-l <V tU H ·rl 
D ti) r:r:l r:r:l :s ~ P-i i:i:: CJ i:i:: ~ r:r:l :> 
FM 68 80 0 4 0 0 0 13 126 52 
FRM 8 17 0 0 0 1 1 2 27 9 
AGM 75 185 6 16 2 22 2 63 217 121 
Class A 30 42 0 2 0 2 1 10 47 25 
Class B 25 41 1 3 0 3 0 6 44 21 
Class c 96 199 5 15 2 18 2 62 279 136 
Total 151 282 6 20 2 23 3 78 370 182 
Table 17 shows that over 95 percent of the human 
error casual factors identified can be attributed to 
five error types. These five error types in descending 
number are error, squadron, vi ala ti on, unforeseen, and 
crew-resource management. These error types, with the 
exception of unforeseen, were examined further to 
determine the impact their reductions may have on MRMs. 
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Figures 15 and 16 show the percentages of these error 
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Figure 17 illustrates the rate of these five human 
error types per 100,000 flight-hours. The 
classifications of squadron and error have consistently 
been factors with the highest rates. However, rates of 
all four human error types per 100,000 flight-hours have 
dropped between 18 and 42 percent during the time-period 
studied. 
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Figure 17: Error Rate per 100,000 Flight-Hours 
F. HUMAN ERROR IMPROVEMENT COST SAVINGS CALCULATIONS 
Cost savings were based upon (a) the expected 
number of mishaps in the future, (b) the associated 
costs of those mishaps, and (c) the likelihood that 
human error played a role in the expected mishaps. 
Estimates based upon reductions of the occurrence of 
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human error by 10, 20, and 30 percent were estimated. 
Cost savings estimates were calculated as follows: 
E[Cost savings] = E[N] * E[Cil * %Error * %Reduction 
Table 18 and Figure 18 show potential cost savings 
over both a one-year and five-year period. 
Table 18: Potential Cost Savings (FY98$M) 
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20 1 8.8 1.7 12.1 5.5 5 36.1 7.0 49.6 22.6 
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Figure 18: Five Year Cost-Savings FY98$M 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The effects of Naval Aviation mishaps are 
significant in terms of fa tali ties, costs, readiness, 
and mission capability. Throughout this past decade, 
Naval Aviation leadership has focused much attention on 
the role of aircrew error and this h~s contributed to an 
overall decrease in aviation mishaps. However, similar 
efforts have not been taken to address MRMs. During the 
1990' s, one in every four Naval Aviation mishaps were 
maintenance-related. Unless significant changes occur in 
the current operational environment, Naval Aviation will 
continue to rely on a diminishing number of fleet 
aircraft that are rapidly aging. The demands for 
aviation maintenance will continue to increase well into 
·the century, as will the opportunities for 
maintenance error. 
· Accident prevention programs are the primary means 
Naval Aviation has to reduce costs associated with 
aviation mishaps. Accidents historically were thought to 
be the result of single events, a belief that is still 
held by some. Only through an understanding of the 
systems that fail and the context in which these 
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failures occur can this belief be put to rest. This 
study shows that accidents are results of a complex 
combination of errors. Naval Aviation must address the 
issue of maintenance error. The only question that 
remains is where to target intervention strategies to 
reduce maintenance error. This study provides insights 
into maintenance error that, if acted upon, may mitigate 
the emerging maintenance problem. 
The present research employed the Human Factors 
Accident Classification System (HFACS) maintenance 
extension. HF ACS applies human error theories to 
aviation mishaps. The HFACS Maintenance Extension is an 
extension of the original HFACS taxonomy that includes 
human error associated directly with maintenance 
actions. .The HFACS Maintenance Extension was used to 
classify 470 Naval Aviation MRMs according to specific 
··human error types. Models were developed on the same 
mishap data to provide insight into the underlying 
processes that comprise Naval Aviation MRMs. The 
information obtained through this classification and 
modeling provided the basis to estimate the costs 
associated with human errors in Naval Aviation MRMs. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined Naval Aviation mishaps in a 
systematic manner. The occurrence of maintenance error 
in past MRMs and mathematical models of mishaps were 
used to evaluate potential effects of maintenance error 
reduction programs. The HFACS Maintenance Extension was 
used to identify the most likely forms that maintenance 
error takes and the conditions associated with those 
errors. It then highlighted where to employ intervention 
strategies and gave the potential cost savings 
associated with that intervention. 
The methodologies used in this study were well 
adapted to the mishaps examined. In particular, the 
variable Poisson process model provided the means to 
predict future mishaps and future costs. This particular 
model was chosen as the simplest model that was suitable 
for predicting future mishaps. The model predicts a mean 
number of MRMs based on a hypothetical Poisson process. 
Probability tables for the number of future mishaps were 
derived from the density function associated with the 
means of the hypothetical Poisson process model. This 
model was cross validated on six-months of additional 
data. The model was found to adequately statistically 
describe mishaps by Type, Class, and total number of 
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mishaps. The variable Poisson process model used in 
conjunction with the HFACS Maintenance Extension allowed 
for the prediction of cost saving estimates for human 
error reduction strategies. 
The average number of mishaps predicted by this 
model per year over the next five years ranged from 22 
to 33 per year. Based on these values, the expected cost 
of MRMs for FY98 was nearly 60 million dollars and well 
over 200 million for FY98 through FY02. 
The HFACS Maintenance Extension categories of 
error, squadron, violation, unforeseen, and crew-
resource management were the most significant 
contributors to cost. At least one of these five error 
dimensions occurred in over 95 percent of the 470 
mishaps studied. An analysis of potential reductions in 
these error types revealed that reductions as low as 10 
percent for a single error type ~an produce cost savings 
of over one million dollars annually. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The use of the HFACS Maintenance Extension is 
recommended to make the study of MRMs more rigorous. 
Using the Maintenance Extension, particularly its 
taxonomy, allows human error intervention strategies to 
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be identified and prioritized. This taxonomy is 
appropriate for the study of aviation maintenance 
mishaps, as well as other accidents that have associated 
maintenance error as causal factors. 
It is recommended that the Naval Safety Center and 
the Naval Air Systems Command work toward revising the 
current procedures for aviation accident investigation 
and mishap reporting to include the HFACS Maintenance 
Extension. Adding the extension would increase the 
usefulness of the existing aviation mishap database by 
standardizing the reporting of MRMs and would aid 
investigators 
mishaps. 
in assessing factors associated with 
Further, it is recommended that the Naval Safety 
Center and Naval Air Systems Command lead an effort to 
study trends in Naval Aviation mishaps using simple 
mathematical models as well as more advanced techniques 
not employed here. Human error theory suggests that the 
complex interactions of several factors result in 
accidents. This suggests that multivariate mathematical 
techniques that directly consider factors such as 
flight-hours flown, number of fleet aircraft, and 
average age of aircraft, would be appropriat~. 
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Valid models of accident causation must predict 
future accident scenarios. Additional research 
evaluating other possible models is recommended. The 
analysis of different mathematical models for the 
prediction of Naval Aviation mishaps and mishap costs 
may identify models that are more suitable than those 
used in this research. 
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APPENDIX A: MONTHLY NUMBER OF MAINTENANCE-
RELATED MISHAPS BY TYPE AND CLASS FOR FY90-FY98 
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-- ----- ---------------------------------
Table Al: Flight Mishaps by FY 
Time 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total Period 
October 1 0 2 4 0 2 1 2 12 
November 2 4 1 1 2 1 1 0 12 
December 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 9 
January 4 6 1 1 2 1 2 2 19 
February 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 0 10 
March 1 1 4 2 2 3 2 1 16 
April 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 7 
May 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 15 
June 1 2 4 3 2 0 1 1 14 
July 1 4 1 1 3 0 1 2 13 
August 2 6 0 1 2 1 1 1 14 
September 1 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 9 
Total 21 30 20 21 19 11 15 13 150 
Table A2: Flight-Related Mishaps by FY 
Time 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total Period 
October 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
November 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
December 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
January 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 
February 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
March 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 5 
April 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
May 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 4 
June 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
July 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
August 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
September 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 
Total 5 7 6 5 5 1 4 1 34 
Table A3: Aircraft-Ground Mishaps by FY 
Time 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total Period 
October 4 2 4 3 2 4 4 4 27 
November 4 2 3 0 3 1 1 0 14 
December 1 4 2 3 1 4 0 2 17 
January 3 5 6 4 4 3 5 0 30 
February 5 3 1 5 4 0 3 3 24 
March 5 3 5 3 3 4 2 1 26 
April 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 16 
May 4 3 5 1 2 2 3 3 23 
June 3 2 2 6 6 2 0 1 22 
July 4 6 4 8 5 2 2 1 32 
August 3 6 1 4 2 1 1 1 19 
September 4 7 3 4 1 2 1 1 23 
Total 42 46 39 42 35 27 23 19 273 
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Table A4: Class A Mishaps by FY 
Time 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total Period 
October 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 7 
November 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 
December 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
January 3 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 8 
February 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
March 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 6 
April 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
May 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 6 
June 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 5 
July 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 6 
August 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 6 
September 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 5 
Total 11 9 10 11 5 5 5 5 61 
Table AS: Class B Mishaps by FY 
Time 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total Period 
October 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
November 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
December 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 
January 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 4 
February 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
March 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 
April 0 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 8 
May 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 
June 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
July 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 
August 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 
September 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 6 
Total 6 13 6 6 4 8 7 5 55 
Table A6: Class c Mishaps by FY 
Time 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total Period 
October 5 2 4 6 3 4 3 4 31 
November 2 6 4 0 4 1 2 0 19 
December 2 4 2 5 3 3 1 1 21 
January 4 11 4 5 6 2 6 3 41 
February 8 3 2 6 5 0 5 3 32 
March 8 4 8 3 6 4 3 1 37 
April 2 2 3 0 3 1 0 2 13 
May 5 2 7 5 3 4 2 3 31 
June 3 4 6 6 6 2 2 2 31 
July 4 9 4 6 6 2 3 3 37 
August 4 7 1 3 3 1 2 1 22 
September 4 7 4 6 2 2 1 0 26 




APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE 
PREDICITION OF HYPOTHETICAL MEANS OF POISSON 
RANDOM VARIABLES 
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The Homogeneous Poisson Process Model 
The homogeneous Poisson process model is a 
relatively simple mathematical model. This model 
attempts to fit a single parameter to a set of data. The 
underlying arrival process that produced the data is 
considered Poisson with mean Ay. Ay is assumed to be the 
mean value of a Poisson distribution of random 
variables. The MRM data was examined by year, by twelve-
month period, and by month. Figures Bl and B2 show the 
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Figure B2: Maintenance-Related Mishap Type by FY 
""'1997 
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1 = "'-'i=t990 Yi 
y A 1Y was calculated The estimate of Ay is 
n 
for all Classes and Types of mishap as well for the 
total number of mishaps. The classical z2 test was used 
to determine the 
goodness of fit 




L 1991 (y; - Ay) · to i=1990 1y 







































statistically describes the yearly data for FRMs, AGMs, 
Class A mishaps, and Class B mishaps. However, the 
homogenous Poisson process model is not appropriate for 
modeling the yearly total number of MRMs or Class C 
mishaps. 
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Figure B3: Twelve-Month Mishap Class by Month 
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Figure B4: Twelve-Month Mishap Type by Month 
The estimate of Am is L
September 
A m; A = i=October • 
m 12 A was 
calculated for all Classes and Types of mishap as well 
for the total number of mishaps. The classical z2 test 
was used to determine the suitability of this estimate. 
A 2 
L September (m; -Am) 2 A to ax11 i=October Am The goodness of fit test compared 
distribution obtaining a probability, P{x}1 ~in}. 
Table B2: Twelve-Month Homogenous Poisson Process Model 
Mishap iy P{xi ~ iy} Suitability Classification 
Flight 12.5 0.516 Not unusual 
Flight-Related 2.8 0.489 Not unusual 
Air-Ground 22.8 0.189 Not unusual 
Class-A 5.1 0.709 Not unusual 
Class-B 4.6 0.931 Not unusual 
Class-C 28.4 0.005 Unlikely 
Total 38.1 0.029 Unlikely 
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The homogeneous Poisson process model adequately 
statistically describes the twelve-month data for FMs, 
FRMs, AGMs, Class A mishaps, and Class B mishaps. The 
twelve-month total number of MRMs and Class C mishaps 
for each month may not be adequately described by a 
homogeneous Poisson random variable. 
The estimate of Aa is L
September1997 
a; 
,2 = i=Ocrober1989 
a 96 
calculated for all Classes and Types of mishap as well 
for the total number of mishaps. The modified 
denominator-free z2 test was used for mishap data 
separated by type and class. This goodness of fit test 
September) 997 ( J " ) 2 
compared Li=Ocrober1989 ..j;;+~a;+l--v4*Xa+l to axis distribution 
obtaining a probability, P{xis ~ .k}. 
Table B3: Continuous-Month Homogenous Poisson Process Model 
Mishap 
.k P{xis ~ k} Suitability Classification 
Flight 1. 6 0.855 Likely 
Flight-Related 0.4 0.999 Likely 
Air-Ground 2.8 0.221 Likely 
Class-A 0.6 0.9.70 Likely 
Class-B 0.6 0.931 Likely 
Class-C 3.6 0.003 Unlikely 
Total 4.8 0.005 Unlikely 
The homogeneous Poisson process model adequately 
statistically describes the continuous-month data for 
FM, FRM, AGM, Class A, and Class B mishaps. However, the 
homogeneous Poisson process model is not appropriate for 
modeling the continuous-month total number of MRMs or 
Class C mishaps. 
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The Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process Model 
The total number of MRMs and Class C mishaps were 
not adequately described by any of the three homogeneous 
Poisson process models proposed. Although the model was 
unlikely, the continuous-month homogeneous Poisson 
process model had the highest likelihood of being an 
adequate estimator. Based on this, and trends noted in 
the data, a continuous month non-homogenous piece-wise 
constant rate function was examined. 
The variance of Poisson random variables equals its 
mean. Therefore in data, of which there is a significant 
range in the size of counts per time unit, problems may 
arise because the larger the count the greater the 
variability. An examination of the square root of the 
count data can be beneficial in decreasing the effects 
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Figure BS: Square Roots of Mishaps by Month 
An examination of Figure BS confirms that a non-
homogeneous Poisson process may be appropriate. In order 
to fit a non-hoinogenous Poisson process with a piece-
wise constant rate function, months were partitioned 
into two groups. The proposed model, A; =AL for the six 
months with the lowest average number of mishaps 
(November, December, February, April, August, and 
September) and A;=A8 the other months, was then tested. 
The means AL and A.8 were estimated to determine 
whether the distribution of the total number of MRMs for 
each month can be described by a non-homogeneous Poisson 
process. The estimate is 
1L __ 29+28+36+24+33+37 




1H __ 43+53+47 +42+39+46 __ 45 • /I,, The classical 
6 
z2 goodneSS· of 
A 2 A 2 ~6(LowMonths) (m;-A1) + ~6(HighMonths) (m;-/i;,) fit test resulted in ~~ ~ ~~· L 
6.69. This value compared to a 
P{x120 ;::::: 6.69}, obtains a probabi 1 i ty of 0.754. Therefore, 
the values of 31.17 and 45 for AL and AH, respectively 
are not that unusual. 
The means AL and AH were estimated to determine 
whether the distribution of Class C mishaps for each 
month can be described by a non-homogeneous Poisson 
process. The estimate of AL is .iL = l9 + 2l+ 32 : 13 + 22 + 26 =22.17 
and the estimate of AH is _iH =31+41+37+31+31+37 = 34_67 . 
6 
The classical z2 goodness of fit test resulted in 
A 2 A 2 ~6(LowMonths) (m;-A,i) + ~6(HighMonths) (m;-k) _ 
~i=I ~ ~i=I L 11.97. This value 
compared to a %120 distribution, P{z120 ;:::::11.97}, obtains a 
probability of 0.287. Therefore, the values of 22.17 and 
34.47 for AL and AH, respectively are not that unusual. 
The non-homogenous P6isson process model adequately 
statistically describes the total number of MRMs and 
Class C mishaps. 
Cross-validation of Homogeneous and Nonhomogeneous 
Poisson Process Models 
Mishap data for October 1997 through March of 1998 
were obtained and used to cross-validate the models 
based on the fiscal year 1990 through 1997 data. The 
87 
homogeneous and nonhomogeneous Poisson process fitted 
models which best fit the original data. This was 
suggested by their associated probability values; they 
were tested to determine if they adequately described 
the new data. The two models tested were the: 
• nonhomogenous Poisson process model for the total 
number of mishaps and Class C mishaps with rates 
~L and ~H. 
• and the continual-month homogeneous Poisson 
process models for FMs, FRMs, and AGMs, Class A 
mishaps, and Class B mishaps with rate k. 
The classical z2 test was used for the total number of 
mishaps and Class C data and the denominator-free 
goodness of fit test was used for the other data. Since 
no estimation was involved, both results were referenced 
to a xi random variable. 
Table B4. Cross-Validation of Homogeneous and 
Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process Models 

























statistically describe FMs, FRMs, Class A mishaps, and 
Class B mishaps. However, a homogeneous Poisson process 
88 
model may not be appropriate for modeling AGMs and the 
· non-homogeneous Poisson process model may not be 
appropriate for the total number of MRMs and Class C 
mishaps. 
Moving Average Method 
The moving average estimation technique is a method 
to generate an estimator based on the average of 
historical data. In this technique it is assumed that 
the overall number of mishaps on month i is a 
realization of a Poisson random variable with mean Ai. 
The expected value A.+1 in month span+l is predicted by 




i=I The mean squared error over all the 
Span 
predictions from month span+l, up to and including the 
last month of analysis is calculated. This is completed 
for every value of span from one up to the maximum span 
of eighty-four. For each span an associated average sum 
of squared error is calculated. The span with the 
smallest average sum of squared error is then chosen as 
the estimator for this mathematical model. 
The first step in the moving average method is· to 
determine the optimal span which produced the minimum 
average squared error. An SPLUS program was written and 
executed which produced the average squared error for 
span lengths ranging from two through eighty-four. The 
89 
Span length that on average produced a minimal amount of 
mean squared error and was used as a basis to calculate 
estimators. The spans that had the minimal amount of 
mean squared error for FM, FRM, AGM, Class A, Class B, 
and Class C mishaps were 3 8, 44, 46, 46, 24, and 3 8 
respectively. 
. m; LSpan 
1 = The estimate of Am is 1=! The modified m Span 
denominator-free .%2 test was used to evaluate the 
model. This goodness of fit test compared 
96-Span ( ~ A )2 Li=I rm: +~m; +l-4*Am +1 to a 2 X96-Span distribution 
obtaining a probabi 1 i ty, P{xi6-span :?: k}. 
Table BS: Moving average Model 
Mishap s pL2 > im} Suitability Classification pan l.%96-Span -
Flight 38 0.946 
Flight-Related 44 0.999 
Air-Ground 46 0.179 
Class A 46 0.974 
Class B 24 0.937 
Class C 38 0. 059 








The moving average model adequately statistically 
describes the monthly data for total MRMs, FMs, FRMs, 
AGMs, Class A mishaps, Class B mishaps, and Class C 
mishaps. 
Cross-validation of the moving average model 
The moving average models that were fit to the 
original data were tested to determine if they 
adequately described the six-months of new data. The 
90 
denominator-free goodness of fit test was used for all 
data. Since no estimation was involved, both results 
were referenced to a x~ random variable. 
Table B6: Cross-validation of the 





Class A 0.803 
Class B 0.790 
Class C 0.413 
Total 0.198 









The moving average model adequately statistically 
describes the total number of mishaps, FMs, FRMs, AGMs, 
Class A, Class B, and Class C mishaps. 
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function(data, a.start= 15, b.start = 1, scale= 1/100){ 
# 




data, the set of putative Poisson 
a.start, b.start: starting values 





Return value: output from nlmin 
# Step one: put data and scale into frame 1 for FUNC 
# 
# 
assign("data", data, frame= 1) 
assign ("scale", scale, frame = 1) # 
# Call nlmin 
# 
} 
out<- nlmin(d.func, c(a.start, b.start), 
max.iter = 100)# 
plot(data, main= paste("Poisson Model for", 
substitute(data)), xlab ="Month", ylab 
= "Mishaps", type = "b") 
y.seq <- out$x[l] * exp( - out$x[2] * (l:length( 
data)) * scale) 






# FUNC: function for doing ML estimation in the 
# Poisson/exponential model. 
# 
# Arguments: param, vector of parameters 
# (The data is "data" in frame 1.) 
# 
# 1: get parameters and data 
a <- param[l] 
b <- param[2] 
data <- get("data", frame = 1) 
scale <- get ("scale", frame = 1) # 
# 2: Set up the "t" vector with multipler of "scale". 
# 
tt <- (l:length(data)) *scale# 
# 
# Compute the two terms in the likelihood; square, add them. 
# 
} 
first<- surn(data/a - exp( - b * tt)) 
second<- surn(tt * (a* exp( - b * tt) - data)) 
return(firstA2 + secondA2) 
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APPENDIX D: FITTED VARIABLE POISSON PROCESS 
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Figure Dl: Variable Poisson Process for MRM FMs 
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Figure D6: Variable Poisson Process for Class C MRMs 
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APPENDIX E: PROBABILITY TABLES FOR THE 
OCCURRENCE OF MAINTENANCE-RELATED MISHAPS 
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Table El: ~Y98 Flight Mishap Probability Table 

















































































































































Table E2: FY98 Flight-Related Mishap Probability Table 





























































































0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 '0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 


















Table E3: FY98 Aircraft-Ground Mishap Probability Table 
ii 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 .9 10 
Oct97 i. 77 
Nov97 i. 75 
Dec97 i. 74 
Jan98 i.12 













































































































































Table E4: FY98 Class A Mishap Probability Table 









































































0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 












































































































































































it 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
·Oct97 1.80 
Nov97 i. 77 
Dec97 1. 75 























































































































APPENDIX F: PREDICTED COSTS OF MAINTENACE-
RELATED MISHAPS 
105 
Table Fl: Predicted Maintenance-Related Flight Mishap Costs 
for FY98-FY02 
FM it 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Oct97 l.01 - 1,897,059 1,914,416 965,966 324,935 81,977 16,545 2,783 401 51 6 5,204,139 
Nov97 1.00 - 1,897,137 1,898,383 949,815 316,813 79,255 15,861 2,645 378 47 5 5,160,341 
Dec97 0.99 - 1,897,080 1,882,350 933,867 308,872 76,618 15,205 2,514 356 44 5 5,116,912 
Jan98 0.98 - 1,896,889 1,866,320 918,121 301,109 74,064 14,574 2,390 336 41 5 5,073,848 
Feb98 0.98 - 1,896,564 1,850,296 902,578 293,520 71,590 13,969 2,271 317 39 4 5,031,147 
Mar98 0.97 - 1,896,107 1,834,282 887,236 286,102 69,193 13,387 2,158 298 36 4 4,988,805 
Apr98 0.96 - 1,895,519 1,818,281 872,095 278,853 66,873 12,830 2,051 281 34 4 4,946,819 
May98 0.95 - 1,894,802 1,802,296 857,153 271,769 64,625 12,294 1,949 265 31 3 4,905,187 
Jun98 0.94 - 1,893,956 1,786,330 842,410 264,846 62,449 11,780 1,852 250 29 3 4,863,905 
Jul98 0.94 - 1,892,983 1,770,386 827,865 258,083 60,342 11,287 1,759 235 27 3 4,822,970 
Aug98 0.93 - 1,891,884 1,754,46"8 813,516 251,475 58,302 10,814 1,671221 26 3 4,782,380 
Sep98 0.92 - 1,890,661 1,738,577 799,363 245,021 56,328 10,359 1,588 209 24 2 4,742,132 
Oct98 0.92 - 1,889,314 1,722,717 785,405 238,716 54,417 9,924 1,508 196 22 2 4,702,222 
Nov98 0.90 - 1,887,845 1,706,891 771,641 232,559 52,567 9,506 1,432 185 21 2 4,662,649 
Dec98 0.90 - 1,886,256 1,691,101 758,068 226,546 50,777 9,105 1,360 174 20 2 4,623,408 
Jan99 0.89 - 1,884,547 1,675,349 744,687 220,674 49,044 8,720 1,292 164 18 2 4,584,497 
Feb99 0.88 - 1,882,720 1,659,639 731,495 214,941 47,368 8,351 1,227 155 17 2 4,545,914 
Mar99 0.87 - 1,880,777 1,643,973 718,492 209,343 45,746 7,997 1,165 145 16 2 4,507,656 
Apr99 0.87 - 1,878,718 1,628,353 705,676 203,878 44,177 7,658 1,106 137 15 1 4,469,720 
May99 0.86 - 1,876,545 1,612,781 693,046 198,544 42,659 7,333 1,050 129 14 1 4,432,103 
Jun99 0.85 - 1,874,260 1,597,261 680,600 193,338 41,191 7,021 
Jul99 0.85 - 1,871,863 1,581,793 668,337 188,256 39,771 6,722 
. Aug99 0.84 - 1,869,357 1,566,381 656,255 183,297 38,397 6,435 
Sep99 0.83 - 1,866,743 1,551,026 644,353 178,458 37,069 6,160 
Oct99 0.82 - 1,864,021 1,535,730 632,629 173,737 35,785 5,896 
Nov99 0.82 - 1,861,194 1,520,496 621,082 169,130 34,543 5,644 
Dec99 0.81 - 1,858,263 1,505,325 609,710 164,636 33,342 5,402 
JanOO 0.80 - 1,855,229 1,490,219 598,512 160,252 32,181 5,170 
FebOO 0.80 - 1,852,093 1,475,180 587,486 155,976 31,058 4,948 
MarOO 0.79 - 1,848,858 1,460,210 576,630 151,805 29,974 4,735 
AprOO 0.78 - 1,845,524 1,445,310 565,942 147,738 28,925 4,530 
MayOO 0.78 - 1,842,094 1,430,482 555,422 143,771 27,912 4,335 
JunOO 0.77 - 1,838,567 1,415,728 545,067 139,904 26,932 4,148 
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99712113 1 4,394,802 
947 114 12 1 4,357,816 
89910811 1 4,321,140 
853 101 11 1 4,284,774 
810 95 10 1 4,248, 713 
768 90 9 1 4,212,956 
729 84 9 1 4,177,500 
692 79 8 1 4,142,342 
657 75 7 1 4,107,481 
623 70 7 1 4,072,912 
591 66 6 1 4, 038, 635 
561 62 6 1 4' 004' 646 
532 59 6 0 3,970,943 
1 0 
t 
4 5 6 1 2 3 FM 
JulOO 0.76 - 1,834,947 1,401,049 534,876. 136,132 25,986 3,968 
AugOO 0.76 - 1,831,233 1,386,446 524,847 132,456 25,071 3,796 
SepOO 0.75 - 1,827,429 1,371,922 514,977 128,871 24,187 3,632 
OctOO 0.74 - 1,823,534 1,357,476 505,267 125,377 23,333 3,474 
NovOO 0.74 - 1,819,551 1,343,112 495,713 121,971 22,508 3,323 
DecOO 0.73 - 1,815,482 1,328,829 486,314 118,651 21,712 3,178 
JanOl 0.73 - 1,811,326 1,314,630 477,068 115,416 20,942 3,040 
FebOl 0.72 - 1,807,086 1,300,515 467,974 112,263 20,198 2,907 
MarOl 0.71 - 1,802,764 1,286,485 459,030 109,191 19,480 2,780 
AprOl 0.71 - 1,798,360 1,272,542 450,233 106,197 18,787 2,659 
MayOl 0.70 - 1,793,876 1,258,686 441,583 103,280 18,117 2,542 
JunOl 0.70 - 1,789,314 1,244,919 433,078 100,438 17,470 2,431 
JulOl0.69 - 1,784,675 1,231,241 424,715 97,670 16,846 2,324 
AugOl 0.68 - 1,779,960 1,217,654 416,493 94,973 16,243 2,222 
SepOl0.68 - 1,775,170 1,204,157 408,410 92,346 15,660 2,125 
OctOl0.67 - 1,770,308 1,190,753 400,465 89,787 15,098 2,031 
z;JovOl 0.67 - 1,765,375 1,177,441 392,655 87,296 14,556 1,942 
DecOl 0.66 - 1,760,371 1,164,222 384,979 84,869 14,032 1,856 
Jan02 0.66 - 1,755,298 1,151,097 3·77,436 82,506 13,526 1,774 
Feb02 0.65 - 1,750,158 1,138,068 370,023 80,204 13,039 1,696 
Mar02 0.64 - 1,744,952 1,125,133 362,739 77,964 12,568 1,621 
Apr02 0.64 - 1,739,682 1,112,294 355,582 75,782 12,113 1,549 
May02 0.64 - 1,734,348 1,099,551 348,550 73,658 11,675 1,480 
Jun02 0.63 - 1,728,952 1,086,905 341,641 71,591 11,251 1,415 
Jul02 0.62 - 1,723,496 1,074,357 334,855 69,578 10,843 1,352 
Aug02 0.62 - 1,717,980 1,061,906 328,189 67,619 10,449 1,292 
Sep02 0.61 - 1,712,406 1,049,553 321,641 65,712 10,069 1,234 
107 
7 8 9 10 Total 
505 55 5 0 3,937,523 
479 52 5 0 3,904,385 
454 49 5 0 3,871,526 
431 46 4 0 3,838,943 
409 43 4 0 3,806,635 
388 41 4 0 3,774,598 
368 38 3 0 3,742,831 
349 36 3 0 3,711,332 
331 34 3 0 3,680,097 
314 32 3 0 3,649,126 
297 30 3 0 3,618,415 
282 28 2 0 3,587,962 
267 26 2 0 3,557,766 
253 25 2 0 3,527,824 
240 23 2 0 3,498,134 
228 22 2 0 3,468,694 
216 21 2 0 3,439,501 
205 19 2 0 3,410,555 
194 18 1 0 3,381,851 
184 17 1 0 3,353,390 
174 16 1 0 3,325,168 
165 15 1 0 3' 297' 183 
156 14 1 0 3,269,434 
148 13 1 0 3' 241, 919 
140 13 1 0 3,214, 635 
133 12 1 0 3,187,581 
126 11 1 0 3,160,754 
245,959,174 
Table F2: Predicted Maintenance-Related Flight-Related 
Mishap Costs for FY98-FY02 
Oct97 0 .16 -
Nov97 0.16 -
Dec97 0 .16 -
Jan98 0.16 -
Feb98 0 .16 -
Mar98 0.15 -







































































































































































































































7 8 9 10 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
·o o o o 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 



































FRM 1 0 
t 






JanOl 0 .09 -







SepOl 0 .OB -





























































































































8 9 10 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 b 0 






























Table F3: Predicted Maintenance-Related Aircraft-Ground 




Oct97 1. 77 -
Nov97 1. 75 -
Dec97 1. 74 -
Jan98 1. 72 -
Feb98 1. 71 -
Mar98 1. 69 -
Apr98 1. 68 -
May98 1. 66 -
Jun98 1. 65 -
Jul98 1. 63 -
Aug98 1.62 -
Sep98 1. 60 -
Oct98 1. 59 -
Nov98 1. 57 -
Dec98 1. 56 -
Jan99 1.54 -
Feb99 1. 53 -
Mar99 1. 52 -
Apr99 1. 50 -
May99 1. 49 -






Dec99 1. 40 -
JanOO 1.38 -
FebOO 1.37 -
MarOO 1. 36 -
AprOO 1. 35 -










2 6' 2 64 
26,421 
























2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
44,422 39,322 23,205 10,270 3,636 1,073 271 60 12 
44,326 38,881 22,736 9,972 3,499 1,023 256 56 11 
44,224 38,439 22,274 9,680 3,366 
44,115 37,997 21,818 9,396 3,237 
44,001 37,554 21,368 9,119 3,113 
43,880 37,111 20,924 8,848 2,993 
43,754 36,668 20,487 8,585 2,878 
43,622 36,226 20,056 8,328 2,766 
43,484 35,784 19,631 8,078 2,659 
43,341 35,342 19,213 7,834 2,555 
43,193 34,902 18,801 7,596 2,455 
43,039 34,462 18,396 7,365 2,359 
42,880 34,023 17,997 7,140 2,266 
42,716 33,585 17,604 6,920 2,176 
42,547 33,148 17,217 6,707 2,090 
42,373 32,713 16,837 6,499 2,007 
42,195 32,280 16,463 6,297 1,927 
42,011 31,848 16,096 6,101 1,850 
41,824 31,418 15,734 5,910 1,776 
41,632 30,990 15,379 5,724 1,704 
41,436 30,564 15,030 5,543 1,636 
41,236 30,140 14,687 5,368 1,569 
41,031 29,719 14,350 5,197 1,506 
40,823 29,300 14,019 5,031 1,444 
40,611 28,883 13,695 4,870 1,385 
40,395 28,469 13,376 4,713 1,329 
40,176 28,057 13,063 4,561 1,274 
39,953 27,649 12,756 4,414 1,222 
39,727 27,243 12,454 4,270 1,171 
39,498 26,840 12,159 4,131 1,123 
39,266 26,439 11,869 3,996 1,076 
39,030 26,042 11,584 3,865 1,031 
38,792 25,649 11,306 3,738 988 
110 
975 242 53 10 
929 229 49 9 
886 216 46 9 
844 204 43 8 
804 192 40 8 
766 182 38 7 
729 171 35 6 
695 162 33 6 
661 153 31 6 
630 144 29 5 
599 136 27 5 
570 128 25 4 
543 121 24 4 
517 114 22 4 
491 107 21 3 
467 101 19 3 
445 95 18 3 
423 90 17 3 
402 85 16 3 
382 80 15 2 
364 75 14 2 
346 71 13 2 
328 67 12 2 
312 63 11 2 
297 59 10 2 
282 56 10 1 
268 52 9 1 
254 49 8 1 
242 46 8 1 
229 44 7 1 







































SepOO 1. 29 -
OctOO 1. 28 -




Mar01 1. 22 -
AprOl 1.21 -











Apr02 1. 08 -
May02 1. 07 -
Jun02 1. 06 































2 3 4 5 
38,551 25,258 11,032 3,614 
38,307 24,870 10,764 3,494 
38,061 24,486 10,502 3,378 
37,812 24,105 10,245 3,266 
37,561 23,728 9,993 3,156 
37,308 23,354 9,746 3,050 
37,052 22,983 9,504 2,948 
36,795 22,617 9,268 2,848 
36,535 22,253 9,036 2,752 
36,274 21, 893 8, 809 2, 659 
36,011 21,537 8,587 2,568 
35,746 21,185 8,370 2,480 
35,480 20,836 8,158 2,395 
35,212 20,491 7,950 2,313 
34,943 20,150 7,747 2,234 
34,672 19,813 7,548 2,157 
34,401 19,479 7,353 2,082 
34' 128 19' 150 7' 163 2' 010 
33' 855 18' 824 6' 977 1, 940 
33,580 18,501 6,796 1,872 
33,305 18,183 6,618 1,807 
33,029 17,869 6,445 1,743 
32,752 17,558 6,275 1,682 
32,475 17,252 
32, 197 16, 949 
31, 918 16, 650 
31,640 16,355 
6, 110 l, 623 
5,948 1,566 
5, 790 1, 510 
5,636 1,457 
111 
6 7 8 9 10 
947 207 39 6 1 
907 196 36 6 1 
869 186 34 6 1 
833 177 32 5 1 
798 168 30 5 1 
764 159 29 4 1 
731 151 27 4 1 
700 143 25 4 1 
670 136 24 4 0 
642 129 22 3 0 
614 122 21 3 0 
588 116 20 3 0 
563 110 18 3 0 
538 104 17 3 0 
515 99 16 2 0 
493 94 15 2 0 
472 89 14 2 0 
451 84 14 2 0 
431 80 13 2 0 
413 76 12 2 0 
395 721120 
377 68 11 1 0 
361 64 10 1 0 
345 61 9 1 0 
330 58 9 1 0 
315 55 8 1 0 






























Table F4: Predicted Maintenance-Related Class A Mishap 
Costs for FY98-FY02 
Class i 0 A t 1 2 3 4 5 
Oct97 0.36 - 3,188,126 1,150,001 207,411 24,939 2,249 
Nov97 0.36 - 3,166,195 1,129,862 201,596 23,980 2,139 
Dec97 0.35 - 3,144,286 1,110,030 195,937 23,057 2,035 
Jan98 0.35 - 3,122,400 1,090,501 190,429 22,169 1,936 
Feb98 0.35 - 3,100,541 1,071,272 185,068 21,314 1,841 
Mar98 0.34 - 3,078,711 1,052,340 179,851 20,492 1,751 
Apr98 0.34 - 3,056,915 1,033,702 174,774 19,700 1,665 
May98 0.33 - 3,035,153 1,015,355 169,834 18,938 1,584 
Jun98 0.33 - 3,013,430 
Jul98 0. 33 - 2, 991, 748 
Aug98 0.32 - 2,970,109 
Sep98 0.32 - 2,948,515 
Oct98 0.32 - 2,926,970 
Nov98 0.31 - 2,905,476 
Dec98 0.31 - 2, 884, 035 
Jan99 0.31 - 2,862,649 
Feb99 0.30 - 2,841,320 
Mar99 0.30 - 2,820,051 
Apr99 0.30 - 2, 798,844 
May99 0.29 - 2,777,701 
Jun99 0.29 - 2,756,624 
Jul99 0.29 - 2,735,614 
Aug99 0.28 - 2,714,674 
Sep99 0.28 - 2,693,806 
Oct99 0.28 - 2,673,010 
Nov99 0.28 - 2,652,290 
Dec99 0.27 - 2,631,646 
JanOO 0.27 - 2,611,080 
FebOO 0.27 - 2,590,594 
MarOO 0.26 - 2,570,189 
AprOO 0.26 - 2,549,867 
MayOO 0.26 - 2,529,629 
JunOO 0.26 - 2,509,477 
997,294 165,027 18,205 1,506 
979,517 160,350 17,500 1,432 
962,020 155,799 16,821 1,362 
944,800 151,372 16,168 1,295 
927,855 147,066 15,540 1,232 
911,179 142,876 14,936 1,171 
894,771 138,801 14,354 1,113 
878' 627 134' 838 13 '795 l, 059 
862,743 130,982 13,257 1,006 
847,117 127,233 12,740 957 
831,744 123,586 12,242 910 
816,623 120,040 11,764 865 
801,749 116,592 11,303 822 
787,120 113,239 10,861 781 
772,731 109,979 10,435 743 
758' 581 106' 809 10' 026 706 
744' 665 103' 727 9' 632 671 
730, 982 100, 731 9' 254 638 
717 ,526 97 ,818 
704' 296 94' 986 
691,289 92,234 
678' 501 89' 558 
665,929 86,958 



















































7 8 9 10 Total 
10 1 0 0 4,572,898 
9 0 0 0 4,523,935 
8 0 0 0 4,475,497 
8 0 0 0 4,427,578 
7 0 0 0 4,380,172 
7 0 0 0 4,333,273 
6 0 0 0 4,286,876 
6 0 0 0 4,240,976 
5 0 0 0 4,195,568 
5 0 0 0 4,150,646 
5 0 0 0 4,106,205 
4 0 0 0 4,062,239 
4 0 0 0 4,018,745 
4 0 0 0 3,975,716 
4 0 0 0 3,933,148 
3 0 0 0 3,891,035 
3 0 0 0 3,849,374 
3 0 0 0 3,808,158 
3 0 0 0 3,767,384 
2 0 0 0 3,727,046 
2 0 0 0 3' 687' 141 
2 0 0 0 3,647,662 
2 0 0 0 3,608,606 
2 0 0 0 3,569,969 
2 0 0 0 3,531,745 
2 0 0 0 3,493,930 
2 0 0 0 3,456,521 
1 0 0 0 3,419,512 
1 0 0 0 3,382,899 
1 0 0 0 3,346,678 
1 0 0 0 3,310,845 
1 0 0 0 3,275,395 
1 0 0 0 3,240,325 
Class 
A it 0 1 2 3 4 
JulOO 0.25 - 2,489,411 629;479 79,586 6,708 
AugOO 0.25 - 2,469,434 617,742 77,266 6,443 
SepOO 0.25 - 2,449,546 606,206 75,011 6,188 
Oct000.24 - 2,429,748 594,868 72,820 5,943 
NovOO 0.24 - 2,410,042 583,726 70,691 5,707 
DecOO 0.24 - 2,390,428 572,776 68,622 5,481 
JanOl 0.24 - 2,370,909 562,017 66,612 5,263 
FebOl 0.23 - 2,351,484 551,444 64,659 5,054 
MarOl 0.23 - 2,332,155 541,055 62,762 4,854 
AprOl 0.23 - 2,312,923 530,848 60,918 4,661 
MayOl 0.23 - 2,293,788 520,819 59,128 4,475 
JunOl 0.22 - 2,274,752 510,967 57,388 4,297 
JulOl 0.22 - 2,255,815 501,288 55,698 4,126 
AugOl0.22 - 2,236,978 491,779 54,057 3,961 
SepOl 0.22 - 2,218,242 482,439 52,462 3,803 
OctOl 0.22 - 2,199,607 473,264 50,913 3,651 
NovOl 0.21 - 2,181,074 464,252 49,409 3,506 
DecOl 0.21 - 2,162,645 455,400 47,948 3,366 
Jan020.21- 2,144,318 446,707 46,529 3,231 
Feb02 0.21 - 2,126,096 438,168 45,151 3,102 
Mar02 0.20 - 2,107,978 429,783 43,813 2,978 
Apr02 0.20 - 2,089,965 421,548 42,513 2,858 
May02 0.20 - 2,072,058 413,461 41,251 2,744 
Jun02 0.20 - 2,054,257 405,520 40,026 2,634 
Jul02 0. 20 2,036,562 
Aug02 0.19 - 2,018,973 
Sep02 0.19 - 2,001,492 
397,723 38,836 


































6 7 8 9 10 Total 
21 1 0 0 0 3,205,631 
20 1 0 0 0 3,171,308 
19 1 0 0 0 3,137,353 
18 1 0 0 0 3' 103' 761 
17 1 0 0 0 3,070,529 
16 1 0 0 0 3,037,653 
15 1 0 0 0 3,005,128 
14 1 0 0 0 2,972,952 
13 1 0 0 0 2,941,121 
12 0 0 0 0 2,909,630 
12 0 0 0 0 2,878,476 
11 0 0 0 0 2,847,656 
10 0 0 0 0 2,817,166 
10 0 0 0 0 2' 787' 003 
9 0 0 0 0 2' 757' 162 
8 0 0 0 0 2,727,641 
8 0 0 0 0 2,698,436 
7 0 0 0 0 2,669,544 
7 0 0 0 0 2,640,961 
7 0 0 0 0 2,612,684 
6 0 0 0 0 2,584,710 
6 0 0 0 0 2,557,035 
5 0 0 0 0 2,529,657 
5 0 0 0 0 2' 502' 572 
5 0 0 0 0 2,475,776 
5 0 0 0 0 2,449,268 
4 0 0 0 0 2,423,044 
203,211,552 
Table FS: Predicted Maintenance-Related Class B Mishap 
Costs for FY98-FY02 
Class i 0 B t 
Oct97 0 .45 -
Nov97 0 .45 -
Dec97 0 .45 -
Jan98 0.45 -
Feb98 0 .45 -
Mar98 0 .44 -
Apr98 0.44 -
May98 0.44 -



















JanOO 0 .40 -
FebOO 0.40 -
MarOO 0.40 -














































































































































































7 8 9 10 Total 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 



















































OctOl 0. 36 -
NovOl 0.36 -
DecOl 0.36 -





























































33, 276 5' 849 
33,025 5,778 
32' 775 5' 708 
32,527 5,639 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
1,006 98 8 1 0 0 0 149,534 
989 96 7 0 0 0 0 148,849 
973 94 7 0 0 0 0 148,166 
957 92 7 0 0 0 0 147,487 
941 90 7 0 0 0 0 146' 810 
926 88 7 0 0 0 0 146,137 
910 87 7 0 0 0 0 145,467 
895 85 6 0 0 0 0 144' 800 
881 83 6 0 0 0 0 144,136 
866 81 6 0 0 0 0 143,475 
852 79 6 0 0 0 0 142,817 
838 78 6 0 0 0 0 142,162 
824 76 6 0 0 0 0 141,510 
810 75 5 0 0 0 0 140,861 
797 73 5 0 0 0 0 140,215 
784 71 5 0 0 0 0 139,572 
771 70 5 0 0 0 0 138,932· 
758 68 5 0 0 0 0 138,295 
745 67 5 0 0 0 0 137,661 
733 66 5 0 0 0 0 137,030 
721 64 5 0 0 0 0 136,401 
709 63 4 0 0 0 0 135,776 
697 62 4 0 0 0 0 135,153 
685 60 4 0 0 0 0 134,533 
674 59 4 0 0 0 0 133' 916 
663 58 4 0 0 0 0 133,302 
652 56 4 0 0 0 0 132, 691 
9,146,477 
115 
Table F6: Predicted Maintenance-Related Class c Mishap 
Costs for FY98-FY02 
Class _.i 0 c t 
Oct97 1.80 -
Nov97 1.77 -
Dec97 L 75 -
Jan98 L 73 -
Feb98 L 70 -
Mar98 L 68 -
Apr98 1. 66 -
May98 1.63 -
Jun98 L 61 -
Jul98 1.59 -




















AprOO L 19 -
MayOO 1.17 -



































2 3 4 5 6 
24,825 22,321 13,380 6,015 2,163 
24,752 21,950 12,977 5,754 2,041 
24,671 21,578 12,582 5,502 1,925 
24,581 21,205 12,195 5,260 1,815 
24,484 20,831 11,815 5,026 1,711 
24,380 20,458 11,444 4,802 1,612 
24,268 20,084 11,081 4,586 1,518 
24,148 19,711 10,726 4,378 1,429 
24,022 19,340 10,380 4,178 1,345 
23,890 18,969 10,041 3,986 1,266 
23,751 18,600 9,711 3,802 1,191 
23,605 18,232 
23' 454 17' 867 
23,297 17,504 
23' 134 17' 143 
22,966 16,785 
22, 792 16,430 
22,614 16,078 
22,431 15, 729 
22,244 15,383 
22,052 15,042 












9,388 3,626 1,120 
9,074 3,456 1,053 
8,767 3,294 990 





7' 093 2' 453 
6,840 2,333 
6' 594 2' 218 
6' 356 .2' 109 




5, 268 1, 631 
5,071 1,548 























7 8 9 10 
648 167 37 7 
603 153 34 7 
561 140 31 6 
522 129 28 5 
485 118 25 5 
451 108 23 4 
419 99 20 4 
389 91 19 3 
361 83 17 3 
335 76 15 3 
311 70 14 2 
288 64 12 2 
267 58 11 2 
248 53 10 2 
230 49 9 1 
213 44 8 1 
197 41 7 1 
183 37 7 1 
169 34 6 1 
156 31 5 1 
145 28 5 1 
134 26 4 1 
124 23 4 1 
114 21 4 1 
106 2 0 3 0 
98 18 3 0 
90 16 3 0 
83 15 2 0 
77 13 2 0 
71 12 2 0 
66 11 2 0 
61 10 1 0 








































OctOO 1. 09 -
NovOO 1. 08 -
DecOO 1.06 -
JanOl 1. 05 -
FebOl 1.03 -
MarOl 1.02 -































































































3, 703 l, 013 
3,557 959 
3,416 909 
3, 280 860 


































































7 8 9 10 
52 8 1 0 
48 8 1 0 
44 7 1 0 
40 6 1 0 
37 6 1 0 
34 5 1 0 
32 5 1 0 
29 4 1 0 
27 4 0 0 
25 4 0 0 
23 3 0 0 
21 3 0 0 
19 3 0 0 
18 2 0 0 
16 2 0 0 
15 2 0 0 
14 2 0 0 
13 2 0 0 
12 1 0 0 
11 1 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
9 1 0 0 
8 1 0 0 
8 1 0 0 
7 1 0 0 
6 1 0 0 
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